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This PhD dissertation consists of three chapters in experimental economics. It involves
various dimensions in which laboratory experiments can play a role: testing the validity
of a game theory, helping understand institutions, and measuring (the change in) social
preferences. It relates to the effects of different institutions on cooperation and social
preferences. Chapter 2 studies to what extent an overlapping membership structure,
which in theory affects the incentives of short-lived players, is conducive to cooperation.
Chapter 3 examines whether the presence of decentralized punishment, especially the
possibility of retaliating a centralized enforcer, has an impact on the decisions of the
enforcer and group cooperation. Chapter 4 studies whether interactions with out-
group members matter for in-group-out-group differences in altruism and whether the
nature of these interactions matters for in-group-out-group differences.
Chapter 2 is about overlapping membership structures within an organization.
Cremer (1986), Salant (1991), Kandori (1992a), and Smith (1992) theoretically prove
that cooperation is possible to be sustained as an equilibrium outcome in repeated
social dilemma games with short-lived members of an organization (players), if the
organization (the replacement of players) is ongoing. The key condition is that mem-
bers are not all replaced by new members at the same time, that is, memberships
in the organization are overlapping. In Chapter 2, the theory is put to the test. An
experiment is set up in which there are multiple ongoing organizations for an indefinite
number of rounds. In each round, there are two players (subjects) in each organization
and they play a prisoner’s dilemma game. Organizations with an overlapping mem-
bership structure are compared to organizations with a non-overlapping membership
structure.
The experimental results show that there is at best weak evidence that an over-
lapping membership structure induces a higher cooperation rate. On the other hand,
subjects’ behavioral patterns are affected by the overlapping membership structure.
Junior members behave more cooperatively than senior members do in organization-
s with an overlapping membership structure. Besides, incoming members are more
sensitive to organizational history in organizations with an overlapping membership
structure than in those with a non-overlapping membership structure. This chapter
contributes to the literature by shedding light on how difficult it is to sustain coop-
eration in the prisoner’s dilemma when subjects play finitely repeated games. It may
also constitute an important part of our understanding of organizational culture by
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demonstrating that cooperative incentives can be transmitted from one generation to
the next.
Chapter 3 is a study on the interaction between institutions and its impact on coop-
eration. Previous literature has shown that when the sanctioning power is delegated to
a legitimate enforcer, free riding can be effectively deterred in social dilemmas so that
high cooperation can be induced. Chapter 3 examines when there is a possibility of de-
centralized punishment, especially a possibility of retaliating the enforcer, whether and
how the enforcer’s sanctioning decisions and group cooperation will change. In partic-
ular, I look at both corruptible and non-corruptible enforcers. I set up an experiment
with a 2 × 2 design, varying whether there is a possibility of decentralized punishment
and whether the enforcer is corruptible. In the experiment, there are groups of four
members and they play a public goods game. Afterwards, the enforcer who was ran-
domly selected redistributes earnings among members, and in some conditions then
all members can reduce any other member’s earnings with a cost.
The experimental results demonstrate different effects of the decentralized pun-
ishment possibility. On the one hand, for a non-corruptible enforcer, her centralized
sanctions are reduced by the possibility of being retaliated. But group contribution-
s are not lowered correspondingly, since peer punishments on free riders offset the
decrease in pro-social centralized sanctions. On the other hand, for a corruptible en-
forcer, even though her excessive and corruptive sanctions are not really restrained by
the presence of decentralized punishment, group contributions decrease as centralized
sanctions become less pro-social. Chapter 3 contributes to the literature by revealing
that dismissing the possibility of decentralized punishment may lead to an overesti-
mation of the effectiveness of centralized sanctioning institutions in improving coop-
eration. Besides, it extends the study about the impact on decentralized punishment
of second-order decentralized punishment to the impact on centralized punishment.
Chapter 4 studies the impacts of competitive and cooperative interactions with
out-group members on in-group-out-group differences in social preferences. Suppose
that people of different races competed for a job position, will they treat each other
in a more hostile way? Or if they all donated to the same charity, will they feel more
favorably towards each other? To answer these questions, An experiment is set up
in which subjects are randomly assigned to either the Red group or the Blue group.
They are asked to do a task which generates earnings and the nature of interactions is
manipulated with different ways of calculating earnings, either cooperative or compet-
itive. There is also a baseline condition in which subjects’ earnings are calculated in
a piece rate. After the task, without knowing its outcome, subjects are asked to make
distributional decisions between self and another randomly selected participant, either
from their own group (in-group matching) or the other group (out-group matching).
In-group-out-group differences are captured by the differences in their choices between
2
in-group matching and out-group matching (Chen and Li 2009; Currarini and Mengel
2016).
The experimental results show that when subjects receive a higher payoff than
their matched players do, cooperative interactions with out-group members decrease
the in-group-out-group difference in altruism, but competitive interactions do not have
an impact. This chapter extends studies on the effect of “personal” contact on out-
group prejudice to an environment with “impersonal” interaction that only an abstract
economic interdependence is imposed between persons from different groups. It also
contributes to relatively scarce literature measuring in-group-out-group differences in
terms of social preferences.
3
Chapter 2
An Experiment on Cooperation in Ongoing
Organizations
2.1 Introduction
In an important paper, Cremer (1986) shows that cooperation among the members
of an organization is possible, even if members have finite lives, as long as the orga-
nization itself is ongoing. The key condition is that members are not all replaced by
new members at the same time. If members share a common last round, the standard
backward induction argument of unraveling of cooperation applies. If, however, mem-
bership is overlapping (staggered) there is no common last round. There is always a
member whose horizon extends beyond that round, and who needs to take into ac-
count the strategy of a new incoming member. If this strategy involves a reward for
cooperative behavior, cooperation can be sustained as an equilibrium outcome.
The model of Cremer (1986) is an application of the overlapping generations model
introduced by Samuelson (1958). Its relevance extends beyond cooperation in orga-
nizations. Other models analyze, for instance, the sustainability of pay-as-you-go
pension plans (Hammond 1975), the supply of intergenerational club goods (Sandler
1982), the scope for arms control between countries (John et al. 1993), the interaction
between junior and senior members of a political party (Alesina and Spear 1988), and
the collaboration between regulatory agents and firm managers (Salant 1995). Sev-
eral studies indicate that the scope for cooperation between finitely-lived players is
furthered by the condition that life spans and terms overlap rather than fully coincide
(Salant 1991; Kandori 1992a; Smith 1992).
In the present paper we put this argument to the test. We set up a laboratory ex-
periment in which an organization exists for an indefinite number of rounds. In each
round, an organization is inhabited by two members who play a prisoner’s dilemma
game. The two members interact with each other for a fixed number of rounds (either
one or three rounds). We implement two different term structures: an overlapping
(OL) structure in which the two members are replaced by new members in different
rounds, and a non-overlapping (NoOL) structure in which the two members are re-
placed in the same round. In line with the analysis of Cremer (1986), we hypothesize
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that the average cooperation rate will be higher in organizations with an overlapping
structure than in those with a non-overlapping structure.
The experimental results show at best weak support for our main hypothesis. Coop-
eration rates are not significantly different between organizations with an overlapping
membership structure and those with a non-overlapping structure. Moreover, this
holds for the case in which members overlap for one round and the case in which they
overlap for three rounds. This does not imply that play is completely insensitive to the
overlapping membership structure. We find that junior (incoming) members cooperate
at a higher rate than senior (outgoing) members. Also, junior members cooperate at
a higher rate when the senior member they interact with cooperated in the previous
round. Such strategic play is not strong enough though to induce substantially higher
rates of cooperation.
There are a few related experimental studies on cooperation in games with an
overlapping generations structure. Van der Heijden et al. (1998) examine whether the
provision of information feedback on the history of play has an effect on the level of
inter-generational transfers. It turns out that it does not have an effect, suggesting
that players do not use this information in a strategic way. Offerman et al. (2001) use
the strategy method to study play in an inter-generational prisoner’s dilemma game.
They find that relatively few subjects use history-dependent strategies, such as trigger
strategies, even when recommended to do so by the experimenters. A recent study
by Duffy and Lafky (2016) has a focus similar to ours. It compares contributions in
public goods games with and without an overlapping generations structure. They find
that average contribution levels are not affected by the matching structure, but that
the pattern of contributions over time is more stable with overlapping matches.
2.2 Theoretical Framework
Our theoretical framework is based on models that study the scope for cooperation in
games with an overlapping membership structure (Cremer 1986; Salant 1991; Kandori
1992a; Smith 1992). It involves an organization that lasts for an indefinite number
of rounds. In each round there are two members (players) in the organization. One
member is assigned role A and the other is assigned role B. The two members play a
symmetric prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game as displayed in Table 2.1.






The membership of the organization changes over time. Let iτ denote the member
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of role i coming to the organization in round τ , where i ∈ {A,B} and τ ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, ...}.
Except for A0 who is only active for one round, each member stays in the organization
for two rounds. Once a member finishes her membership in the organization, she
is replaced by an incoming member of the same role. In each round, one member
in the organization is replaced. Hence, the membership of each member overlaps the
membership of one other member for one round. This matching structure with 2-round
memberships and 1-round overlapping memberships is depicted in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Players with 2-round memberships and 1-round overlapping memberships
Round
Role 1 2 3 4 5 ...
A A0 A2 A2 A4 A4 ...
B B1 B1 B3 B3 B5 ...
If the PD game is played repeatedly by finitely lived players with overlapping
memberships, there exist subgame perfect equilibria with cooperative outcomes. In
a player’s last round in the organization, it is always optimal to defect since there is
no shadow of the future. Cooperative incentives can only emerge before players are
in the last round of their membership. Label players in their first (last) round in the
organization as junior (senior). Consider the strategy profile in which players cooperate
if and only if they are juniors and they see that all preceding members cooperated when
they were juniors. It is not profitable to deviate from cooperation to defection when
a junior faces a history in which there was no defection. If a junior cooperates, she
will elicit cooperation when she is a senior, assuming an incoming member sticks to
the equilibrium strategy. Her total equilibrium payoff is π(C,D) + π(D,C) = 3. If
a junior player defects, she will face defection when she is senior, which yields total
payoff π(D,D)+π(D,D) = 2. The overlapping membership structure allows for partial
cooperation, with an increase in average per-round payoffs from 1 to 1.5, compared
with the equilibrium in which players always defect.
Let xsi,τ denote the action of player iτ in term s, where s ∈ {1, 2}. Let ∆i,τ =
(∆1i,τ ,∆
2
i,τ ) denote the strategy profile of player iτ . Specifically, ∆
s
i,τ stands for the
probability that player iτ in term s plays C. A subgame perfect equilibrium strategy
profile is the following.1
∆si,τ =
{
1 if s = 1 and x1j,t = C for all j ∈ {A,B}, for all t < τ
0 otherwise
The possibility for cooperative equilibria extends to games with longer member-
ships. In particular, we consider a game in which a member stays in the organization
1Note that this grim trigger strategy is not the only strategy that can sustain cooperation. For
example, there is a “resilient” strategy that punishes defectors, but does not punish punishers, which
can also sustain cooperation by junior members as a subgame perfect equilibrium (Bhaskar 1998).
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for six rounds, except for A0 who is in the organization for only three rounds. Once a
member finishes her membership in the organization, she is replaced by an incoming
member of the same role. One member in the organization is replaced every three
rounds. Hence, the membership of each member overlaps the membership of one other
member for three rounds. This matching structure with 6-round memberships and
3-round overlapping memberships is depicted in Table 2.3. Again, let iτ denote the
player with role i entering the organization in round τ .
Table 2.3: Players with 6-round memberships and 3-round overlapping memberships
Round
Role 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 ...
A A0 A0 A0 A4 A4 A4 A4 A4 A4 A10 A10 A10 A10 ...
B B1 B1 B1 B1 B1 B1 B7 B7 B7 B7 B7 B7 B13 ...
It is still optimal for players to defect in the last round of their terms. The most
efficient equilibrium outcome can be sustained as follows. Consider a strategy profile
in which players cooperate if and only if they are in one of their first five rounds in
the organization and they see that all preceding members cooperated in their first five
rounds in the organization.
Except that s ∈ {1, 2, ..., 6}, notations for this case are the same as before. A
cooperative subgame perfect equilibrium strategy profile is as follows.
∆si,τ =
{
1 if s ≤ 5 and xkj,t = C for all j ∈ {A,B}, for all t < τ, for all k ≤ 5
0 otherwise
It is easily checked that this strategy profile constitutes a subgame perfect equilib-
rium. Compared to the equilibrium in which all players always defect, the cooperative
equilibrium increases average per-round payoff from 1 to 1.83. In the experiment we
aim to explore to what extent this cooperative potential is realized.
In contrast, if players of both roles enter and exit the organization at the same time,
there exists a unique uncooperative subgame perfect equilibrium in which all players
always defect (zero cooperation rate), regardless of finite lengths of memberships.
If we take into account social preferences, such as referring to Fehr and Schmidt
(1999), cooperative equilibria are possible to be sustained even if memberships are not
overlapping. Take the case of 1-round non-overlapping memberships as an example.
If β ≥ 1/3, where β captures advantageous inequality aversion, full cooperation can
be sustained as an equilibrium outcome.2 Then cooperation rates are expected to be
high with both overlapping and non-overlapping membership structures.
2The condition is derived from u(C,C) = 2 ≥ u(D,C) = 3− β(3− 0). But to cooperate is not a




2.3 Experimental Design, Hypotheses and Proce-
dure
2.3.1 Design
In all the sessions of our experiment, subjects repeatedly play the PD game displayed
in Table 2.1. Since infinite repetitions cannot be implemented in the lab, a random
continuation rule is employed. Each session consists of at least 30 rounds. Starting
from the 30th round, after a round finishes, the computer randomly draws a number
between 1 and 100. If the number is smaller than or equal to 90, the experiment
continues for one more round; if the number is larger than 90, the experiment stops.
The probability that the experiment continues for at least one more round after the
30th round is 90%.3
There are four treatments in our experiment, 1-OL, 1-NoOL, 3-OL, and 3-NoOL. In
all treatments, there are multiple organizations. Each organization has two members
(subjects) in each round. After a subject finishes her membership in one organization,
she switches to a new organization which is randomly selected.
The treatments differ in matching protocols. In the 1-OL treatment, the member-
ship of each organization changes as displayed in Table 2.2; in each round one of the
two members is replaced by a new member. In the 1-NoOL treatment, membership of
the organization also changes from one round to the next, but now both members are
replaced at the same time. What is common is that in both the 1-OL treatment and
the 1-NoOL treatment members interact with a different member after each round.
In the 3-OL treatment, the membership of the organization changes as displayed in
Table 2.3; after every 3 rounds one of the two members is replaced by a new member.
In the 3-NoOL treatment, membership of the organization also changes after every 3
rounds, but now both members are replaced at the same time. What is common is
that in both the 3-OL treatment and the 3-NoOL treatment members interact with a
different member after three rounds.
In our design, the number of rounds a member interacts with the same other
member (either 1 or 3) is kept constant between the OL and NoOL treatments. This
implies that the number of rounds a member is in an organization is larger in the OL
treatments (2 or 6 rounds) than in the NoOL treatments (1 or 3 rounds).
One feature of our experiment is that re-matching across organizations is allowed.
3There are basically four approaches to implement infinite repetitions with discounting: random
continuation rule (RT), fixed part with payoff discounting plus random continuation rule (D+RT),
fixed part with payoff discounting plus coordination game (D+C), and block random continuation
rule (BRT). These approaches are discussed in Frechette and Yuksel (2013). We use a variation of
the second approach (D+RT) with a fixed part without payoff discounting (see also Norman and
Wallace 2012). This approach implements a degree of discounting to sustain cooperative equilibria
(0.9 < δ < 1) and guarantees there is a minimum number of rounds before the game ends.
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Besides being practical, re-matching is not unrealistic in organizational contexts and
captures features of job rotation and turnover.4 Possible effects of re-matching on
results are explored and discussed in section 2.4.4.
In all treatments, subjects have access to the complete decision history of their
current organization. At the end of each round, they are also informed of their own
earnings and the earnings of the member they just interacted with.
2.3.2 Hypotheses
The first prediction is that there is a difference between the cooperation rates of the
OL and NoOL treatments. For the 1-OL treatment, the most efficient subgame perfect
equilibrium entails an average cooperation rate of 50%. For the 3-OL treatment, the
most efficient equilibrium involves an average cooperation rate of 83.3%. There is no
cooperative subgame perfect equilibrium for the 1-NoOL and 3-NoOL treatments so
that the average cooperation rates of the 1-OL and 3-NoOL treatments are hypothe-
sized to be zero.5
H1.a: The cooperation rate in the 1-OL treatment is higher than that in the 1-NoOL
treatment.
H1.b: The cooperation rate in the 3-OL treatment is higher than that in the 3-NoOL
treatment.
The second prediction is about subjects’ junior and senior terms in the organization.
For a subject in the 1-OL treatment, term 1 is her junior term and term 2 is her senior
term. For the 3-OL treatment, it is less obvious to define junior and senior terms. Since
the most efficient equilibrium outcome indicates that there is reduction in cooperative
incentive from term 5 to term 6, we define a subject’s junior terms as consisting of
her first five terms and her senior terms as consisting of her last term. According to
the equilibrium strategies discussed above, subjects in the OL treatments behave more
cooperatively in their junior terms than in their senior terms.
H2.a: The cooperation rate over subjects’ junior terms is higher than that over their
senior terms in the 1-OL treatment.
H2.b: The cooperation rate over subjects’ junior terms is higher than that over their
senior terms in the 3-OL treatment.
4Otherwise, we have to recruit more subjects for each session and let them wait before they are
assigned to an organization and after they leave an organization.
5Kandori (1992b) extends the Folk theorem of repeated fixed matching games to random matching
games, by referring to “contagious equilibrium”. But this theoretical possibility is not empirically
supported. Duffy and Ochs (2009) find that no cooperative norm emerges in random matching games
which theoretically sustain cooperation. We hereby choose to stick to the equilibrium in which players
always defect when they are randomly (re)matched.
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The final set of hypotheses concern organizational history. Even though orga-
nizational history is displayed in all treatments, its strategic relevance varies across
matching protocols. If a subject switches to a new organization, in the OL treatments
she sees the previous decision(s) of the other active member she will interact with
in the new organization; while in the NoOL treatments she is only exposed to previ-
ous decision(s) of members who have already left the current organization. Incoming
members in the OL treatments can punish or reward the other active (senior) member
based on the organizational history, but in the NoOL treatments an incoming member
does not obtain any strategically relevant information. This difference in strategic
relevance of organizational history motivates the following hypotheses.
H3.a: Incoming members in the 1-OL treatment are more sensitive to organizational
history than those in the 1-NoOL treatment.
H3.b: Incoming members in the 3-OL treatment are more sensitive to organizational
history than those in the 3-NoOL treatment.
2.3.3 Procedure
The experiment was run in March and April, 2015 at Centerlab, Tilburg University
and it was computerized using the Z-tree software (Fischbacher 2007). Subjects were
Tilburg students and recruited via an online system. Upon arrival, subjects were
assigned to computers by randomly choosing one card from a pile of numbered cards.
Since each session required an even number of participants, some students who showed
up could not participate but got a show-up fee. Once subjects were seated in the lab,
printed copies of the instructions were distributed and subjects got ample time to
read the instructions and ask questions. After they answered all control questions, the
experiment started. When the experiment ended, two rounds were randomly chosen
and earnings in the two rounds were added up for subjects’ final earnings.
In total, 16 sessions were run and 228 subjects participated in the experiment.
Each treatment consisted of 4 sessions. The number of subjects in each session ranged
from 12 to 18 and the number of organizations ranged from 6 to 9. In each session, the
organizations were divided into two independent matching groups, except for sessions
8 and 11 which had only one matching group because too few people showed up. On
average, each session lasted for 38 rounds and took about 45 minutes. Subjects earned




2.4.1 Cooperation across Treatments and over Time
Table 2.4 displays average cooperation rates by treatment as well as rank-sum tests
comparing the treatments.
Table 2.4: Average cooperation rates by treat-
ment
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Notes: Cooperation rates are reported in percentages.
An independent matching group is a unit of observation.
Standard deviations are in parentheses. N denotes the
number of independent matching groups.
The average cooperation rate across all the treatments is 15.79%. The average
cooperation rate in the 1-OL treatment is 13.47%, which is higher than that in the 1-
NoOL treatment (12.61%). Also, the average cooperation rate in the 3-OL treatment
(19.82%) is higher than that in the 3-NoOL treatment (17.37%).
We conduct rank-sum tests on cooperation rates, using matching groups as units of
independent observations. The cooperation rates in the 1-OL and 1-NoOL treatments
are not significantly different (p-value = 0.82). The same holds for the cooperation
rates in the 3-OL and 3-NoOL treatments (p-value = 0.56) and those in pooled OL
and NoOL treatments (p-value = 0.52).6 These experimental results do not support
the hypothesis that an overlapping membership structure is conducive to cooperation.
We also look at the heterogeneity of cooperation across organizations. According
to the theoretical framework in section 2.2, for organizations with an overlapping
membership structure there exist multiple equilibria with different cooperation levels;
while for organizations with a non-overlapping membership there is a unique non-
cooperative equilibrium. Therefore, a natural hypothesis is that the heterogeneity of
cooperation across organizations is larger with an overlapping membership structure
than with a non-overlapping membership structure.




To examine heterogeneity we first calculate the cooperation rate for each organi-
zation. We then compute the standard deviation of organizations’ cooperation rates
within each matching group. This gives us one measure of heterogeneity for each
matching group. The averages of these measures by treatment are presented in Table
2.5. We find that the heterogeneity across organizations in the 3-OL treatment is
larger than that in the 3-NoOL treatment (significant at 10% with a one-tailed test).
Heterogeneity is also somewhat larger in the 1-OL treatment than in the 1-NoOL
treatment, but this effect is weaker (p-value = 0.46 with a one-tailed test). So there is
limited evidence to support the hypothesis that an overlapping membership structure
leads to larger heterogeneity of cooperation across organizations.
Table 2.5: Heterogeneity of cooperation across organizations by treatment








N = 7 N = 8
Notes: Figures reported in the second
and third columns are the averages of the
measures of heterogeneity in cooperation
rates across organizations by treatment.
Standard deviations of these measures
are in parentheses. N denotes the number
of independent matching groups.
Next, we investigate how cooperation develops over time. Figure 2.1 shows that
there is a declining trend of cooperation rates in all treatments. As subjects gain
experience they behave less cooperatively on average. No salient differences are found
between the OL treatments and the NoOL treatments, in either the level or the de-
clining pattern of cooperation rates. The patterns of the 1-OL/1-NoOL treatment
on the one hand and the 3-OL/3-NoOL treatment on the other hand are somewhat
different. In the 3-OL and 3-NoOL treatments, cooperation rates display more regular




This figure shows how cooperation rates evolve over time. The solid
lines are for the raw data and the dashed lines are for fitted values. For
most organizations there were more rounds, but for ease of comparison
the development is truncated at round 30.
Figure 2.1: Cooperation rates over time
The average cooperation rates over different subsets of rounds are displayed in Ta-
ble 2.6. We distinguish rounds 1-15, rounds 16-30, and rounds 31 and higher. Recall
that all organizations lasted for 30 rounds after which there was a continuation prob-
ability of 90%.
Table 2.6: Cooperation rates over round subsets
Treatment rounds 1-15 p-value rounds 16-30 p-value rounds 31-end
1-OL 21.48 0.02 13.44 0.12 7.14
1-NoOL 17.02 0.02 9.90 0.35 7.66
3-OL 23.15 0.24 19.48 0.35 9.75
3-NoOL 23.47 0.02 13.99 0.35 13.27
Notes: Cooperation rates are reported in percentages. Independent matching
groups are the units of observations. P -values refer to matched-pairs signed-rank
tests. The p-values in the 3rd column are for the comparisons between rounds
1-15 and rounds 16-30. The p-values in the 5th column are for the comparisons
between rounds 16-30 and rounds 31 and later.
The signed-rank tests show that the cooperation rate over rounds 1-15 is significant-
ly higher than that over rounds 16-30, except in the 3-OL treatment. The significance
does not hold for the comparison between the cooperation rates over rounds 16-30 and
rounds 31-end. Cooperation decays significantly over the first 30 rounds but not further
after round 30. This is not surprising since cooperation rates in some organizations
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already approach zero by round 30. For no subset of rounds, is there a significan-
t difference between the cooperation rates in the OL and NoOL treatments. These
evidences further confirm that an overlapping membership structure is not strongly
conducive to cooperation.
To explore behaviors before any re-assignment took place, we also test the treat-
ment effects of overlapping memberships on cooperation rates in round 1 (for both
the 1-round and 3-round treatments) and round 3 (only for the 3-round treatments)
respectively, excluding the subjects who played for fewer rounds at the start of the
experiment. The difference in the cooperation rates in round 1 between the 1-OL and
1-NoOL treatments is marginally significant (p-value = 0.1). The cooperation rates
are not significantly different between the 3-OL and 3-NoOL treatments in both rounds
1 and 3 (p-value = 0.5 for round 1; p-value = 0.4 for round 3). These results suggest
at best weak differences in cooperation rates between the OL and NoOL treatments
before re-assignment.
2.4.2 Junior and Senior Terms
Cooperation rates by subjects’ junior and senior terms are presented in Figure 2.2.
We see that the cooperation rates are lower over subjects’ senior terms than over their
junior terms.
The graphs display the cooperation rates of juniors and seniors over
time in the 1-OL and 3-OL treatments. The horizontal axis denotes
block, which consists of three consecutive rounds. For example, rounds
1-3 constitute Block 1, rounds 4-6 constitute Block 2, and so on.
Figure 2.2: Cooperation rates of juniors and seniors over time
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Table 2.7: Cooperation rates by junior and senior terms
Junior Senior p-value
1-OL 15.06 11.94 0.09
3-OL 20.97 9.47 0.03
Notes: Cooperation rates are re-
ported in percentages. Column
4 displays the p-values of two-
sided signed-rank tests comparing
subjects’ senior and junior terms.
The cooperation rates over subjects’ junior terms are significantly higher than those
over their senior terms in both the 1-OL and 3-OL treatments (at 5% with a one-tailed
test). This outcome supports Hypothesis 2 that the juniors are more cooperative than
the seniors.7
One may wonder whether the lower cooperation rates of senior members are due to
a general declining trend of cooperation (see Figure 2.1). After all, on average senior
members act in later rounds than junior members do. Indeed, estimation results reveal
a significantly negative effect of the round number on cooperation. However, even if we
control for this effect, we still find a significantly positive effect of junior membership
on cooperation rates. This holds for both the 1-OL and 3-OL treatments. Results
are reported in Table 2.12 in Appendix.8 These results indicate that junior members
cooperate at a higher rate than senior members do even when the negative time trend
is controlled for.
For the 3-OL treatment, we also explore how cooperation develops over subjects’
six terms in the organization. The results are in Figure 2.3.
7This result is robust to other definitions of junior term in the 3-OL treatment (consisting of first
1, 2, 3, and 4 terms) (p-value ≤ 0.06 ).
8The positive effect of being a junior with the parametric test does not depend much on how we
define the junior term in the 3-OL treatment. For example, it holds when we define the junior term
as the first term in the organization but also when we define it as the first 5 terms in the organization.
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This figure shows the cooperation rates over terms in the 3-OL treat-
ment.
Figure 2.3: Cooperation rates over terms in the organization
Subjects behave less cooperatively when they proceed from term 1 to term 3. When
they interact with another incoming member in term 4, the cooperation rate increases
(p-value=0.09). Subjects also behave less cooperatively from term 4 to term 6. The
cooperation rates are lower in terms 3 and 6 than in other terms. In term 6, subjects
have no future with their current opponent and they are going to leave their current
organization. So the cooperation rate in term 6 is even lower than that in term 3
(p-value=0.03).
2.4.3 Organizational History and Individual Behavior
Until now we have mainly focused on aggregated data. To test the hypotheses on the
strategic relevance of organizational history in the OL treatments, it is necessary to
analyze individual-level data. If a subject in the OL treatments detects uncooperative
historical behaviors of the other active member in her current organization, she can
punish her opponent base on this historical information. In the NoOL treatments,
however, organizational history is not strategically relevant for a newcomer of an orga-
nization in the sense that she cannot directly depend on the historical information to
punish or reward her opponent. The organizational history in the NoOL treatments
can only affect decisions through a learning effect or as a coordination device. In order
to disentangle a learning or coordination effect of organizational history from a strate-
gic effect, we compare the effects of historical information on newcomers’ decisions in
the OL treatments with the effects in the NoOL treatments.
We first look at the comparison between the 1-OL and 1-NoOL treatments. We use
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mixed effect logistic regressions with three levels: subject, organization, independent
matching group. The dependent variable is the action that an incoming member
subject i takes in round t (Coopit). Regressors mainly include a time trend (Round), a
one-round lagged dependent variable (Coopit−1), the action taken by the other member
j of subject i’s previous organization in round t − 1 (Coopjt−1), the initial action of
the subject i (Coopi1), and two pieces of historical information for subject i’s current
organization (CoopAt−1 and Coop
B
t−1). A denotes the role currently assigned to the
incoming member subject i and B is the other role in subject i’s current organization.
CoopAt−1 stands for the action taken by the member of role A in round t−1 and CoopBt−1
stands for the action taken by the member of role B in round t − 1. Hence, in the
1-OL treatment CoopBt−1 is the action that subject i’s current opponent took in round
t − 1, while in the 1-NoOL treatment CoopBt−1 is the action taken in round t − 1 by
the preceding member whom subject i’s current opponent replaces. CoopAt−1 always























Indep: sd( cons) 0.166 0.300
(0.207) (0.210)
Org: sd( cons) 0.595 0.566
(0.107) (0.143)
Observations 1,455 2,008
Notes: This table presents the estimates
with a mixed-effect logistic model. Random
effects are captured by random intercepts
grouped by independent matching group
and organization. The dependent variable
Coopit is the action taken by an incoming
member subject i in round t. The reported
coefficients stand for the marginal effects on
the unobserved “latent” dependent variable
rather than on Coopit. Standard errors are
in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1.




1 are significant and positive in both
treatments. A subject is more likely to cooperate if she or the other member in her
previous organization cooperated in the previous round. Subjects’ initial choice, which
can be viewed as a proxy of their cooperative tendency, is also predictive for their later
choices.
In the 1-OL treatment, CoopBt−1 has a significantly positive impact. When an
incoming member sees that the other member cooperated in the previous round, she
is more likely to cooperate, ceteris paribus. This result is consistent with the fact
that CoopBt−1 is the strategically most relevant piece of historical information. The
significance does not hold for the 1-NoOL treatment. Role B now refers to a member
that has already left the organization so that CoopBt−1 is not strategically relevant.
To test whether the effect of organizational history is different between the 1-OL and
1-NoOL treatments, we pool the data of the two treatments. The interaction term
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of the treatment dummy and CoopBt−1 is significant (p-value<0.001). These results
support H3.a that incoming members in the 1-OL treatment are more sensitive to
organizational history than those in the 1-NoOL treatment. At the same time, the
effect in the 1-OL treatment is not large enough to induce significantly high cooperation
levels. Calculations reveal that the marginal effect of CoopBt−1 on Coop
i
t is only about
0.09. If a junior member plays C rather than D, this increases the probability that the
next junior member plays C by only 9% on average.
In the 3-OL and 3-NoOL treatments, organizational membership changes every







t−k/3, as regressors for organizational history. We estimate the case in
which the subject i is an incoming member (in term 1).























Indep: sd( cons) 0.437 1.532
(0.380) (0.504)
Org: sd( cons) 0.634 1.83e-07
(0.282) (0.270)
Observations 321 614
Notes: This table presents the estimates
with a mixed-effect logistic model. Random
effects are captured by random intercepts
grouped by independent matching group
and organization. The dependent variable
Coopit is the action taken by an incoming
member subject i in round t. The reported
coefficients stand for the marginal effects
on the unobserved “latent” dependent
variable rather than on Coopit. Standard
errors are in parentheses. ***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.





significantly positive effect in the 3-OL treatment but not in the 3-NoOL treatment.
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nificant (p-value < 0.001). We conclude that incoming members in the 3-OL treatment
are more sensitive to organizational history than those in the 3-NoOL treatment.9
2.4.4 Robustness Check: the Effect of Re-matching
As outlined in the section of design, when subjects exit an organization they are
randomly re-matched to another organization. This means that there is a positive
probability that subjects will encounter each other again in a later round. We have
matching groups varying in sizes from 6 to 10 subjects and sessions with 10-18 partic-
ipants, while there are at least 30 rounds of play and 40 rounds of play in expectation.
Subjects may realize that they are likely to interact with the same subject again in
the future (even though they cannot know when this occurs). If subjects take this
into account they may have an incentive to behave cooperatively even in the NoOL
treatments. The distinction between the OL and NoOL treatments might thus be
somewhat diluted due to the presence of (frequent) re-matching.
To address this issue, we set up additional 3-OL and 3-NoOL treatments with
matching groups of 16 or 18 subjects.10 To further decrease the probability that
subjects interacted more than once, we set the minimum number of rounds to 10 (this
was 30 in the original treatments) and reduced the continuation probability to 70%
(this was 90% in the original treatment).
Moreover, we used rotating matching such that a subject, if possible, was re-
matched to a subject she had not played with before. With this new design, the
probability that a subject was matched to another subject more than once decreased
from close to 100% in the original sessions to less than 5% in these extra sessions. At
the same time, cooperative equilibria still exist for organizations with an overlapping
membership structure.
The average cooperation rates for these additional treatments are presented in the
row “10 + 70%” of Table 2.10. For ease of comparison we also include the cooperation
rates for the original treatments, now labeled “30+90%”. The results show that the d-
ifference in cooperation between the 3-OL and 3-NoOL treatments is more pronounced
for the new treatments (“10 + 70%”) than for the original treatments (“30 + 90%”).
The difference is still not statistically significant though. To rule out the effect of
9We have performed additional regressions in which the average historical cooperation rate of an
organization was added as an explanatory variable to the models of Tables 2.8 and 2.9. Doing so does
not change the result that in the OL treatments an incoming member is more likely to cooperate if the
incumbent member cooperated in the last round(s). The effect of the average historical cooperation
rates itself is positive, and significantly so (only) in the NoOL treatments.
10In total, 10 extra sessions were run in October 2016 and 178 subjects participated. The number
of subjects was 18 in nine sessions; one session had 16 subjects. There was one independent matching
group per session. Details are reported in Appendix Table 2.13. None of the subjects had participated
in any of the earlier sessions.
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different numbers of rounds, we also look at average cooperation rates over the first 10
rounds. The difference between the 3-NoOL (10+70%) and 3-OL(10+70%) treatments
is not significant either. 11
Table 2.10: Average cooperation rates by treatment (including additional treatments)


















N = 5 N = 5
Notes: Cooperation rates are reported in percentages. The
rows of “All rounds” display statistics over all rounds, and
the rows of “First 10 rounds” display statistics over the first
10 rounds. An independent matching group is a unit of
observation. Standard deviations are in parentheses. N stands
for the number of independent matching groups.
Moreover, again cooperation rates display a declining time trend in both the 3-OL
and 3-NoOL treatments, and the difference between the two treatments weakens with
time (see Figure 2.4 in Appendix). The results about the different cooperation rates
for junior and senior terms and for the effect of organizational history on cooperation
carry over to the two additional treatments. Results are reported in Tables 2.14 and
2.15 respectively in Appendix.
In summary, the presence of (frequent) re-matching seems to dilute the differ-
ence between overlapping and non-overlapping memberships somewhat but does not
saliently alter the behavioral patterns related to an overlapping membership structure.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper investigates cooperation in ongoing organizations with overlapping mem-
bership structures. Our experimental results provide at best weak support for the pre-
11We hypothesized that a more pronounced difference in cooperation would be driven by a decrease
in the cooperation rate in the new 3-NoOL (10+70%) treatment compared with the 3-NoOL (30+90%)
treatment, because multiple interactions between the same players are less likely in the new treatment.
However, the increased (though still insignificant) difference between the 3-OL and 3-NoOL sessions is
(partly) driven by an unexpected increase in cooperation in the 3-OL (10+70%) treatment compared
with the 3-OL (30+90%). Since this difference is not statistically significant though we do not wish
to make too much out of it.
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diction that an overlapping membership structure is conducive to cooperation. And
this holds irrespective of whether the overlapping memberships are short (1 round)
or long (3 rounds). This conclusion is consistent with the results in Offerman et al.
(2001) who also find relatively low cooperation rates, and with Duffy and Lafky (2016)
who find no difference in the contributions between overlapping and “fixed” matching
protocols.
Why does an overlapping membership structure fail to induce cooperation in our
experiment? One possibility is that our experiment allows for little learning. In our
experiment, participants can learn as they move from one organization to the next,
but all organizations have only one life. Dal Bó (2005) and Duffy and Ochs (2009)
implement indefinitely repeated games with fixed matching and they allow subjects
to play multiple of these games. They find that it takes some learning before subjects
start to cooperate and before cooperation levels in indefinitely repeated games become
significantly higher than those in one-shot games or games with random matching.
It cannot be ruled out that cooperation levels will go up if subjects participate in a
sequence of overlapping membership games. From an applied perspective, however,
one may wonder how realistic such learning possibilities are. It is as if at some point
all organizations start all over again.
Another possibility is that cooperation is just harder to sustain with an overlapping
matching structure than in comparable repeated games with fixed matching. Some
theoretical arguments indeed seem to point in that direction. Bhaskar (1998) points
out that cooperation can only be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium if players
take the complete history of the game into account, which seems rather demand-
ing. Messner and Polborn (2003) indicate that cooperation in overlapping generations
games is not robust to small random shocks to the payoffs, unlike cooperation in re-
peated games with fixed matching. We leave it to future work to perform a direct and
integrated comparison of repeated games with fixed matching and repeated games
with overlapping matching.
Our study does not include a baseline treatment with fixed matching. To rule
out the possibility that it is the payoff structure and continuation probability in our
study that lead to a cooperation failure in the OL treatments, we refer to Duffy and
Ochs (2009). They use a similar payoff structure to our experiment and the same
continuation probability of 90% to implement infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma
games.12 They show that in the treatment with random matching and no information
about the previous action taken by the subject’s current opponent, cooperation rates
on average start at 43% and approach zero by round 30. These results are consistent
with what we observe in the 1-NoOL treatment (see the upper-right graph in Figure
12The payoffs they use are (10,10), (0,30), (30,0), (20,20) for actions (D,D), (C,D), (D,C), (C,C)
respectively. The size of matching groups in their study is 14 subjects.
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2.1). They also display that in the treatment with fixed matching and full history of
actions cooperation rates on average start at 48% and rise to above 70% as subjects
gain experience. The ascending time trend of cooperation rates supports that our
choice of the payoff structure and continuation probability can empirically sustain
cooperation in infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games with fixed matching.
Even though not leading to high levels of cooperation, an overlapping membership
structure does generate some notable behavioral patterns in our experiment. Specif-
ically, we find that junior members are significantly more cooperative than senior
members. The shadow of the future places at least some constraint on opportunistic
behavior. Moreover, we find that junior members are affected by information about
past behavior in the organization. Junior members are more likely to cooperate if
the senior member they interact with also cooperated as a junior. This indicates that
cooperation in an organization is contagious to some extent, and is transmitted from
one generation to the next. This may constitute an important component to our un-




2.6.A Tables and Figures
Table 2.11: Cooperation rates by independent matching group
Treatment Session Indep Subject Round CR CR (first 30 rounds)
1-OL 3 1 8 35 13.57 15.00
1-OL 3 2 8 35 32.14 33.33
1-OL 4 3 8 56 12.72 20.83
1-OL 4 4 10 56 5.71 6.33
1-OL 5 5 8 47 12.50 17.50
1-OL 5 6 8 47 8.24 10.83
1-OL 6 7 8 41 10.67 11.25
1-OL 6 8 8 41 12.20 15.83
1-NoOL 7 9 6 43 17.44 18.89
1-NoOL 7 10 8 43 17.73 21.25
1-NoOL 8 11 10 31 3.55 3.67
1-NoOL 9 12 8 30 22.92 22.92
1-NoOL 9 13 8 30 10.00 10.00
1-NoOL 10 14 8 42 8.03 6.67
1-NoOL 10 15 8 42 8.63 10.83
3-OL 11 16 10 40 24.50 28.67
3-OL 12 17 8 41 1.52 2.08
3-OL 12 18 8 41 14.63 14.17
3-OL 13 19 6 45 9.63 14.44
3-OL 13 20 8 45 22.78 23.75
3-OL 14 21 6 30 39.44 39.44
3-OL 14 22 6 30 26.67 26.67
3-NoOL 15 23 6 40 7.08 7.78
3-NoOL 15 24 8 40 50.31 50.00
3-NoOL 16 25 8 30 3.33 3.33
3-NoOL 16 26 8 30 17.08 17.08
3-NoOL 17 27 6 39 6.84 8.89
3-NoOL 17 28 6 39 18.80 20.56
3-NoOL 18 29 6 38 25.88 31.67
3-NoOL 18 30 6 38 9.65 10.56
Notes: Column 2 (3) reports the serial numbers of sessions (independent matching
groups). Column 4 (5) reports the numbers of subjects (rounds) for all matching
groups. Column 6 displays the cooperation rates by independent matching group
over all rounds. Column 7 displays the cooperation rates by independent matching
group over the first 30 rounds. Cooperation rates are reported in percentages.
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Table 2.12: Estimates for the junior-term effect on cooperation








Round -0.064*** -0.036*** -0.049*** -0.018**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Junior 0.431*** 0.777*** 0.500*** 1.066***





Constant -1.620*** -1.777*** -2.174*** -2.624***
(0.272) (0.544) (0.263) (0.332)
Observations 2976 2046 2910 1,994
Notes: This table presents the estimates with a mixed-effect
logistic model. Random effects are captured by random inter-
cepts grouped by organization and independent matching group.
The dependent variable is the action subject i takes in round t
(Coopit). Junior is the dummy variable for whether the subject is
currently a junior (first 5 terms) (=1) or a senior (=0). Coopit−1
the action taken by subject i in round t − 1. Coopjt−1 is the
action taken by subject i’s previous opponent j in round t − 1.
Standard errors are in the parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1.
Table 2.13: Cooperation rates by independent matching group in additional treatments
Treatment Session Indep Subject Round CR CR (first 10 rounds)
3-OL (10+70%) 19 31 18 11 14.65 15.56
3-OL (10+70%) 20 32 18 11 48.99 51.67
3-OL (10+70%) 23 33 18 18 13.58 21.11
3-OL (10+70%) 25 34 18 10 25.00 25.00
3-OL (10+70%) 26 35 18 12 44.44 48.33
3-NoOL (10+70%) 21 36 18 13 8.97 10.56
3-NoOL (10+70%) 22 37 18 11 18.18 20.00
3-NoOL (10+70%) 24 38 16 11 21.02 21.88
3-NoOL (10+70%) 27 39 18 12 26.39 31.11
3-NoOL (10+70%) 28 40 18 12 13.89 15.56
Notes: Column 2 (3) reports the serial numbers of sessions (independent matching groups).
Column 4 (5) reports the numbers of subjects (rounds) for all matching groups. Column
6 displays the cooperation rates by independent matching group in additional treatments
over all rounds. Column 7 displays the cooperation rates by independent matching group




Table 2.14: Cooperation rates by junior and senior terms in additional treatments
Treatment Junior Senior p-value
3-OL (10+70%) 31.52 11.63 0.04
Notes: Cooperation rates are reported in per-
centages. Column 4 displays the p-values of
the two-sided signed-rank tests comparing
subjects’ senior and junior terms.
Table 2.15: Estimates of determinants of cooperative decisions in additional treatments























Notes: This table presents the estimates with the same model
as in Table 2.9 for the two additional treatments (10+70%).




This figure shows how cooperation rates evolve over time in the ad-
ditional treatments. The solid line is for 3-OL (10 + 70%) and the
dashed line is for 3-NoOL (10 + 70%).
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The Effect of Decentralized Punishment on
Centralized Sanctioning Institutions: An Ex-
perimental Study
3.1 Introduction
In social dilemma situations, the pursuit of individual interests conflicts with the maxi-
mization of social welfare, yielding free-riding problems and low cooperation. One way
of governing free riders is to formally transfer sanctioning power to a centralized au-
thority. For example, villagers turn to their heads for adjudicating disputes over local
resources exploitations. Leaders of work teams are appointed to discipline workers who
shirk. Managers are given the power to determine the share of bonus among subordi-
nates. In view of their importance in practice, centralized sanctioning institutions in
which a legitimate enforcer is responsible for deterring free riders are widely explored
(Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Vyrastekova and Van Soest 2003; Fehr and Fischbacher
2004; Güth et al. 2007; Anielski et al. 2009; Van der Heijden et al. 2009; O’Gorman
et al. 2009; Baldassarri and Grossman 2011; Cox et al. 2013; Stoddard et al. 2014).
Most of these centralized institutions prove to be effective in alleviating free-riding
problems and improving cooperation.
A common feature of these studies is that they rule out the presence of decentralized
punishment. They do not take into account the possibility that people can informally
castigate all others, including the enforcer.1 The possibility of hurting the enforcer
might affect the enforcer’s sanctioning decisions and group cooperation. Thus this
paper addresses two research questions. 1) How will the enforcer’s centralized sanctions
be affected by the possibility of getting punished? 2) How will cooperation under the
enforcer’s regulations change with the possibility of decentralized punishment?
It is not unusual to see that enforcers get counter-punished by those who are
sanctioned by them.2 An example is the workplace retaliation on bosses, managers
1In some of the studies, in which group memberships are fixed, subjects can punish all other group
members by contributing less, but the enforcer cannot be targeted for punishment based on her prior
sanctions.
2The enforcer is also likely to be punished if she sanctions cooperators or fails to sanction free
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or team leaders. If an employee is publicly criticized or his bonus is cut by his boss,
he might want to let his boss suffer as well. There are various informal ways to
counter-punish the boss, e.g. spreading rumors, sending anonymous SMS, scratching
the car of the boss or even physically hurting the boss. A number of empirical and
theoretical researches in management do find that if employees feel that they are
mistreated by their bosses, they are more likely to undermine their bosses in private
or publicly challenge them and they feel justified to do so (Folger 1993; Bies and Tripp
1998; Mitchell and Ambrose 2007). Another example is the revenge on policemen.
Policemen who collect fines from lawbreakers or arrest criminals may well face the
retaliation by these lawbreakers and criminals.
With realistic threats of retaliation as described above, the enforcer might be less
willing to sanction other members to avoid potential hurt. But is this conducive or
detrimental to cooperation? The answer can be dependent on whether the enforcer is
corruptible. Corruption includes various dishonest or illegal behaviors by people who
have authority, such as bribery, embezzlement, fraud, and extortion (Klitgaard 1988).
In my study, I focus on embezzlement which means theft or appropriation of public
resources by people with authority (Amundsen 1999). If the enforcer has no chance to
embezzle, the presence of decentralized punishment can erode cooperation. As is found
in Nikiforakis (2008), the possibility of counter-punishment makes the enforcer less
willing to implement centralized sanctions on free riders, leading to lower cooperation.
If the enforcer has chance to embezzle or simply say that she is corruptible, the presence
of decentralized punishment is likely to help cooperation. Previous studies point out
that, if the enforcer can determine the allocation of generated surplus, she has an
incentive to keep a larger portion for herself (Van der Heijden et al. 2009; Stoddard
et al. 2014; Van Leeuwen et al. 2015). Such corruptive behaviors as embezzlement
can be detrimental to cooperation, because members might lower contributions to
reduce potential unfairness in earnings. If other members can monitor and punish
the enforcer, she is likely to decrease corruptive behaviors and excessive (anti-social)
sanctions, which might be conducive to cooperation.
In answering the research questions, I look at both non-corruptible and corruptible
enforcers. I conduct an experiment with a 2 × 2 design, varying whether the enforcer is
corruptible and whether the decentralized punishment possibility is present. Basically,
subjects make decisions in a social dilemma situation. When the enforcer is corruptible,
the enforcer has a chance to embezzle money by reducing others’ benefits. When the
possibility of decentralized punishment is present, subjects can reduce other members’
earnings with certain cost.
The results show different effects of the possibility of decentralized punishment for
riders, because people might want to implement a social norm of fairness and justice. But the
social norm enforcement effect of second-order punishment is not strongly supported by evidences in
previous studies (e.g. Cinyabuguma et al. 2006; Denant-Boemont et al. 2007).
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non-corruptible and corruptible enforcers. On the one hand, a non-corruptible enforcer
implements weaker sanctions with the possibility of decentralized punishment. But co-
operation does not decrease saliently, since the emergence of decentralized punishment
on free riders offsets the decrease in centralized sanctions on free riders. On the other
hand, in the case with a corruptible enforcer, cooperation decreases significantly with
the possibility of decentralized punishment. The main reason is that even though the
size of centralized sanctions is not affected, the pro-sociality of centralized sanctions
is weakened by the possibility of decentralized punishment.
My paper relates to three strands of literature. First, it contributes to the liter-
ature on centralized enforcers by allowing other people to respond to the enforcer’s
sanctions. My results indicate that leaving out the possibility of decentralized punish-
ment from the analysis can lead to an overestimation of the centralized institution’s
effectiveness on cooperation. Second, it expands the scope for exploring the effect of
second-order punishment on cooperation (Cinyabuguma et al. 2006; Denant-Boemont
et al. 2007; Nikiforakis 2008; Balafoutas et al. 2014). Previous studies mainly focus
on whether the effectiveness of decentralized punishment is affected by second-order
punishment.3 I study whether the effectiveness of centralized sanctions is affected by
second-order punishment. Moreover, I look at this effect for both non-corruptible and
corruptible centralized enforcers. Third, it contributes to the literature on the inter-
action between centralized (formal) and decentralized (informal) sanctions (e.g. Kube
and Traxler 2011; Andreoni and Gee 2012). The formal institutions they study are
simple regulating rules of punishment on noncompliance, which is different from the
case in which a real person implements sanctions. For a simple regulating rule, not
only is there no uncertainty of centralized sanctions on noncompliance once detected,
but also there is no room for corruptibility.
To the best of my knowledge, only one paper Van Leeuwen et al. (2015) has a focus
close to my study in the sense that they also allow other players to respond to the
leader’s use or abuse of leadership power. But in their study, the form of other players’
responses is ostracism by majority voting instead of decentralized punishment.
3.2 Experimental Design, Hypotheses and Proce-
dure
3.2.1 Design
In the experiment, I use a variation of a linear public goods game with 4 group mem-
bers for social dilemma situations. After group members make decisions on investing
3Balafoutas et al. (2014) investigate whether the effectiveness of third-party punishment on coop-
eration is affected by counter-punishment.
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in public goods, the enforcer, who is randomly chosen, implements sanctions by redis-
tributing members’ points earned in the public goods game. This form of sanctioning
is related to allowing a leader to determine each member’s share of group output (Van
der Heijden et al. 2009; Cox et al. 2013; Van Leeuwen et al. 2015). A non-corruptible
enforcer can only redistribute among other members’ earnings so that she cannot trans-
fer others’ money to herself, while a corruptible enforcer can redistribute all members’
earnings, which generates room for her to embezzle money. After the enforcer imple-
ments sanctions, in some treatments there is possibility for members to punish each
other. In particular, members can punish each other by inducing a constant cost to
punishment ratio of 1/3.4
There are four treatments in the experiment, NoCorrupt/NoDP, NoCorrupt/DP,
Corrupt/NoDP, and Corrupt/DP. They are displayed in Table 3.1. In all treatments,
subjects play a multiple-stage game, which varies with the treatment.
Table 3.1: Summary of treatments
No corruptibility Corruptibility
No decentralized punishment NoCorrupt/NoDP Corrupt/NoDP
Decentralized punishment NoCorrupt/DP Corrupt/DP
In the first stage of all treatments, each of Members 1, 2, and 3 receives 30 points
and Member 4 receives 20 points. In other words, once the enforcer is selected, there
assumes to be a lump-sum cost, here equal to 10 points, for Member 4 to enforce
centralized sanctions.5 Members 1, 2, and 3 each decide how much of their endowment
they want to contribute to the group account. Member 4 does not make a decision in
this stage, and the purpose is to make Member 4 a truly fair-minded and “benevolent”
enforcer in treatments with no corruptibility by ruling out the concern that she free
rides in the public goods game. The return from the group account depends on the
total amount of points that Members 1, 2, and 3 contribute. Specifically, every point
a member contributes to the group account gives each group member a return of 0.55
points, that is, the marginal per capita return (MPCR) is 0.55. Denote the contribution
of Member i as ci. The earnings of Member i in the first stage are as follows.
π1i =
{
30− ci + 0.55×
∑3
k=1 ck if i = 1, 2, 3
20 + 0.55×
∑3
k=1 ck if i = 4
4The constant cost to punishment ratio of 1/3 has been applied to several other experiments (e.g.
Fehr and Gächter 2002; Gächter et al. 2008; Herrmann et al. 2008).
5As you will see in appendix B, the level of Member 4’s endowment, 20 points, can sustain a
cooperative subgame perfect equilibrium easier in the NoCorrupt/NoDP (Corrupt/DP) treatment
than in the NoCorrupt/DP (Corrupt/NoDP) treatment. And the motivation is to make theoretical
predictions consistent with the previous intuitive argument, that is, the possibility of decentralized
punishment erodes cooperation when the enforcer cannot embezzle while improves cooperation when
the enforcer is corruptible.
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Corruptibility
In the second stage, Members 1, 2, and 3 do not make a decision in this stage. Member
4 first chooses how many points to collect from members, and then decides how to
allocate the collected points to them. Points collected from Member i range between
zero and (π1i − 10). In other words, after this stage, each member at least keeps 10
points in his private account.
For treatments with no corruptibility, Member 4 collects and allocates points among
Members 1, 2, and 3. Denote the number of points collected from Member i as di and
those allocated to him as ai. The second-stage earnings of Members i are as follows.
π2i =
{
−di + ai if i = 1, 2, 3
0 if i = 4
For treatments with corruptibility, Member 4 collects and allocates points among
all members in her group. So Member 4 has a chance to appropriate points by reducing
the earnings of other members. The second-stage earnings of Member i in this case
are as follows.
π2i = −di + ai if i = 1, 2, 3, 4
The second-stage earnings π2i can be positive, zero or negative. If the second-stage
earnings of Member i are negative, it means Member 4 imposes a centralized sanction
upon Member i.
Decentralized punishment
Subjects in treatments with no decentralized punishment play a two-stage game. The
earnings in a period equal to the sum of the earnings in the two stages. Subjects in
treatments with decentralized punishment play a three-stage game. The earnings in a
period equal to the sum of the earnings in the three stages.
In the third stage of treatments with decentralized punishment, all group members
each decide how many points to deduct from the account of other members. The
cost of a point deducted from the account of other member is 1/3. There is a budget
constraint for decentralized punishment. The total number of points that a member
can deduct from other members cannot exceed 3 × (his first-stage earnings + his
second-stage earnings). Since subjects are guaranteed to leave the lab with positive
earnings, allowing unlimited costly punishment is not possible. Denote the number of
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points deducted from the account of Member j by Member i as pij. The earnings of







pij/3 if i = 1, 2, 3, 4
As stated before, group members at least keep 10 points in their private accounts
after the second stage. This is to avoid a situation in which Member 4 in treatments
with decentralized punishment takes away all the earnings of a member so that the
member is not able to punish Member 4 afterwards.
Matching and information disclosure are as follows. Each treatment consists of 10
periods. First, at the beginning of each period, subjects are randomly (re)assigned to
groups of 4 members. Then the four members in a group are randomly assigned to be
Members 1, 2, 3, and 4. In other words, this experiment uses a strangers matching
protocol. For public goods games, both designs of partners matching and strangers
matching make sense in reality. Think about a corporation whose membership is stable
and a temporary work team on a project. Previous studies also use both matching
protocols. In particular, Nikiforakis (2008) compares both matching protocols and
finds that even though contribution levels are lower with strangers matching than with
partners matching, the counter-punishment effect on contributions is quite similar for
both matching protocols. I choose the strangers matching protocol for clearer one-shot
theoretical predictions.6 Last, after each stage, group members are informed about all
the decisions made in that stage and the corresponding earnings.
3.2.2 Hypotheses
First of all, I make standard subgame perfect equilibrium predictions in which individ-
uals are assumed to only care for their own material payoffs. In the NoCorrupt/NoDP
treatment, it does not hurt the centralized enforcer (Member 4) to implement sanction-
s. There exist multiple subgame perfect equilibria. One of the most efficient equilibria
exists in which Members 1, 2, and 3 each contribute all 30 points and Member 4












In the Corrupt/NoDP treatment, the dominant strategy for Member 4 is to take
away as many points as possible for her own sake, leaving 10 points for each of Members
1, 2, and 3. Then there is no difference between that Members 1, 2, and 3 contribute
nothing and that they contribute everything. So the most efficient equilibrium exists
6Fehr and Gächter (1999) show that regardless of whether there is decentralized punishment,
the average contributions in public goods games between strangers matching and perfect strangers
matching protocols are NOT significantly different. They point out that their strangers matching
treatment represents a good approximation to true one-shot experiments.
7Here I identify a contributor as a free rider (cooperator) if he contributes fewer (more) points
than the average contribution amount of the group.
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in which Members 1, 2, and 3 each contribute all 30 points and Member 4 takes away

















where ci is the contribution of Member i and i = 1, 2, 3.
For treatments with decentralized punishment, the best response for all members in
the third stage should always be not to punish any other member with a cost. In other
words, the presence of decentralized punishment is hypothesized to have no impact on
the enforcer’s sanctions and group cooperation if individuals only care for their own
material payoffs.
If I take into account preferences for fairness, for example, referring to the model
by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), theoretical arguments and predictions can be different.
In the NoCorrupt/NoDP treatment, not only is there no direct cost of Member 4’s
sanctions, but also there is no risk that she might be retaliated afterwards. Member
4 should be willing to sufficiently punish free riders so that a high contribution level
will be induced. A cooperative subgame perfect equilibrium exists in which Members
1, 2, and 3 each contribute all 30 points (see Proposition 1 in appendix B).
In the NoCorrupt/DP treatment, fairness preferences can motivate peer punish-
ment in the third stage.8 The possibility of retaliating Member 4 induces a cost for
her sanctions. As suggested by Nikiforakis (2008) and Denant-Boemont et al. (2007),
enforcers’ fear for retaliation may decrease their sanctions on free riders. Since free-
riding cannot be effectively prevented by centralized sanctions, a high contribution
level cannot be sustained as easily as in the case in which retaliation threats are not
present (see Proposition 2 in appendix B). 9
Hypotheses 1: effects of decentralized punishment possibility in the case with a
non-corruptible enforcer
H1.1: The contribution level in the NoCorrupt/DP treatment is lower than that in
the NoCorrupt/NoDP treatment.
H1.2: The intensity of centralized sanctions in the NoCorrupt/DP treatment is lower
than that in the the NoCorrupt/NoDP treatment.
In the Corrupt/NoDP treatment, only if Member 4 is sufficiently averse to ad-
vantageous inequality in which she receives a higher payoff than other members do,















4 = (110 + 1.2
∑3
i=1 ci)/4. In this case,
8In addition to the punishment driven by fairness preferences, there also proves to be a preference
for retaliation, that is, the desire to hurt those who make one to suffer (Falk et al. 2005).
9On the other hand, the presence of decentralized punishment is likely to be a supplement to
the decreased centralized sanctions, since it can also be targeted at free riders. In this sense, it is
ambiguous whether contributions will decrease compared to the NoCorrupt/NoDP treatment.
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the dominant strategy of other members is to contribute all 30 points (see Proposi-
tion 3.1 in appendix B). Otherwise, out of self-interest, Member 4 will appropriate as
much as possible, leading to a high level of (anti-social) centralized sanctions. Then
for Members 1, 2, and 3, no matter how much they contribute, they will be left with
only 10 points. The more they contribute, the more Member 4 can seize for her-
self. Due to their aversion to disadvantageous inequality in which they receive lower
earnings than Member 4 does, the three members should not contribute anything.
In this situation, there exists a unique uncooperative equilibrium in which Members















4 = 80 + 1.2
∑3
i=1 ci (see Proposition 3.2
in appendix B).
In the Corrupt/DP treatment, the disadvantageous inequality aversion of other
members will lead to intense punishments against Member 4 for her severe corrup-
tion. With a much larger cost, her excessive sanctions and corruptive behaviors may
be restrained to some extent. To make a specific hypothesis about the change in
contributions, I conduct an equilibrium analysis based on the model of fairness by
Fehr and Schmidt (1999). By imposing a constraint upon disadvantageous inequality
aversion, I present that the condition about the advantageous inequality aversion of
Member 4 is more relaxed for an equilibrium with full cooperation to be sustained in
the Corrupt/DP treatment than in the Corrupt/NoDP treatment (see Proposition 4
in appendix B). So I hypothesize that the contribution level is more likely to be higher
in the Corrupt/DP treatment than in the Corrupt/NoDP treatment.
Hypotheses 2: effects of decentralized punishment possibility in the case with a
corruptible enforcer
H2.1: The contribution level in the Corrupt/DP treatment is higher than that in the
Corrupt/NoDP treatment.
H2.2: The intensity of centralized sanctions in the Corrupt/DP treatment is lower
than that in the Corrupt/NoDP treatment.
3.2.3 Procedure
The experiment was run in April and May, 2016 at Centerlab, Tilburg University and it
was computerized using the Z-tree software (Fischbacher 2007). Subjects were Tilburg
students and recruited via an online system. Upon arrival, subjects were assigned
to computers by randomly choosing one card from a pile of numbered cards. After
subjects were seated in the lab, printed copies of the instructions were distributed. The
experimenter read instructions aloud in front of all subjects and then subjects answered
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control questions. After they answered all control questions correctly, the experiment
started. When the experiment ended, earnings in one period were randomly chosen
for subjects’ final earnings.
In total, 14 sessions were run and 188 subjects participated in the experiment.
The number of subjects was 52 in both the NoCorrupt/NoDP and Corrupt/NoDP
treatment, 44 in the NoCorrupt/DP treatment, and 40 in the Corrupt/DP treatment.
The number of subjects in each session is either 12 or 16. Each session consisted of
one or two independent matching groups. On average each session lasted for one hour.




Figure 3.1: Evolutions of the average contributions over time
Figure 3.1 displays the evolution of the average contributions over time for all treat-
ments. In line with previous experimental findings, the average contribution for each
treatment starts at approximately 50% of subjects’ endowments. The average contri-
bution of the NoCorrupt/NoDP treatment mildly increases over time, from 13 to 21
points. The average contributions of the NoCorrupt/DP and Corrupt/NoDP treat-
ments are relatively stable over time. The average contribution of the Corrupt/DP
treatment declines over time, from 13 to 9 points. The average contribution in the
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NoCorrupt/DP treatment lies below the average contribution in the NoCorrupt/NoDP
treatment, and the average contribution in the Corrupt/DP treatment lies below the
average contribution in the Corrupt/NoDP.
Table 3.2: Average contributions by treatment












Notes: This table presents the average contributions per contributor
by treatment. A unit of observation is an independent matching
group. N is the number of independent matching groups. Standard
deviations are in parentheses.
Table 3.2 displays the average contributions by treatment as well as rank-sum
tests comparing across treatments. In the NoCorrupt/DP treatment, the average
contribution level is 15.57, which is lower than that in the NoCorrupt/NoDP treatment
(17.00). Also, the average contribution level in the Corrupt/DP treatment (10.90) is
lower than that in the Corrupt/NoDP treatment (14.66).
I conduct rank-sum tests on contributions, using matching groups as units of in-
dependent observations. The contributions in the NoCorrupt/NoDP and NoCorrup-
t/DP treatments are not significantly different (p-value = 0.60). The same holds for
the contributions in the Corrupt/NoDP and Corrupt/DP treatments (p-value = 0.14).
Another finding is that the contribution level in the Corrupt/DP treatment is signifi-
cantly lower than that in the NoCorrupt/DP treatment (p-value = 0.05; see appendix
Table 3.10). It implies that corruptibility erodes cooperation when the enforcer can
be punished.
I also parametrically test the effect of decentralized punishment possibility on con-
tributions by controlling for period. Table 3.3 displays the parametric estimates. The
column of “NoCorrupt” shows the results for treatments with no corruptibility and
the column of “Corrupt” shows the results for treatments with corruptibility.
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Table 3.3: Tobit random effects estimates of determinants of contributions
NoCorrupt Corrupt
Variables Contribution Contribution






No. observations 720 690
No. subjects 96 92
Wald χ2 38.32*** 8.57**
Log likelihood -2048.04 -2040.41
Notes: This table reports the estimates with a
Tobit random effects model. The dependent
variable is the individual-level contribution, which
is left censored at 0 and right censored at 30.
The variable Period captures the time trend. Dec
punishment = 1 if the possibility of decentralized
punishment is present; otherwise Dec punishment
= 0. Robust standard errors (bootstrap) are in
parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
The coefficient of Dec punishment is not significant for treatments with no corrupt-
ibility, while it is negative and significant for treatments with corruptibility. In the
case with a non-corruptible enforcer, the presence of decentralized punishment does
not significantly decrease contributions so that H1.1 is not supported. In the case
with a corruptible enforcer, the presence of decentralized punishment reduces contri-
butions substantially, which is at odds with H2.1 that contributions are increased by
the presence of decentralized punishment.
One thing to notice is that the rank-sum test and parametric test lead to different
results about whether there is a significant effect of the decentralized punishment
possibility on contributions in the case with a corruptible enforcer. Since the statistical
power is lower in the rank-sum test (62.2%) than in the parametric test (≥ 99.95%),
if there is truly an effect the parametric test is more likely to detect it.10
3.3.2 Centralized Sanction and Corruption
The next step is to examine whether the possibility of decentralized punishment weak-
ens centralized sanctions. Members’ second-stage earnings are determined by central-
ized sanctions. Since the total second-stage earnings of all group members are always




i = 0), π
2
i cannot be directly used to summarize the intensity of a
centralized sanction. The intensity of a centralized sanction on Member i (i = 1, 2, 3)
10The statistical power is calculated with a two-tail test at 5% type I error level. The same argument
also applies to the analysis in the next subsection.
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is then measured by max?(0,−π2i ). If a member gets negative earnings in the sec-
ond stage (π2i < 0), the intensity of the centralized sanction on him is equal to −π2i ,
that is, the absolute value of his second-stage earnings; otherwise, the member is not
sanctioned by the enforcer so that the intensity should be zero.
Table 3.4: Average intensities of centralized sanctions by treatment












Notes: This table presents the average intensities of centralized
sanctions on each contributor by treatment. A unit of observation
is an independent matching group. N is the number of independent
matching groups. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Table 3.4 presents the average intensities of centralized sanctions on Members 1,
2, and 3 by treatment. In the NoCorrupt/DP treatment, the average intensity is 3.03,
which is lower than that in the NoCorrupt/NoDP treatment (3.49). Also, the average
intensity in the Corrupt/DP treatment (10.61) is lower than that in the Corrupt/NoDP
treatment (11.72).
I conduct rank-sum tests on intensities of centralized sanctions, using matching
groups as units of independent observations. The intensities of centralized sanctions
in the NoCorrupt/NoDP and NoCorrupt/DP treatments are not significantly different
(p-value = 0.35). The same holds for the comparison between the Corrupt/NoDP
and Corrupt/DP treatments (p-value = 0.81). Another finding is that the presence
of corruptibility always increases centralized sanctions substantially (p-value ≤ 0.01;
see appendix Table 3.11). This result indicates that Member 4 is inclined to embezzle
money through redistribution in case she gets a chance.
I also conduct Tobit random effects estimations to examine the effect of decen-
tralized punishment possibility on centralized sanctions. There are two model speci-
fications. In the first specification, in addition to Period and Dec punishment, I add
Free-riding which denotes the extent to which a subject contributes fewer than the
group average contribution. The second model specification is added with an inter-
action term between Dec punishment and Free-riding. Adding the interaction term
is to explore to what extent free riding induces a weaker centralized sanction with
the presence of decentralized punishment compared to the case in which decentralized
punishment is not possible. Table 3.5 presents the results separately for treatments




Table 3.5: Tobit random effects estimates of determinants of centralized sanctions
Model 1 Mode 2
NoCorrupt Corrupt NoCorrupt Corrupt
Variables Cen sanctions Cen sanctions Cen sanctions Cen sanctions
Dec punishment -1.887*** -0.235 0.274 -0.921
(0.715) (1.514) (1.109) (1.522)
Free-riding 1.699*** 1.492*** 1.963*** 1.403***
(0.128) (0.161) (0.207) (0.206)
Dec punishment × Free-riding -0.548** 0.290
(0.273) (0.272)
Period 0.081 2.233*** 0.103 2.252***
(0.111) (0.171) (0.107) (0.179)
Constant -6.090*** -7.389*** -7.056*** -7.223***
(0.932) (1.675) (0.876) (1.540)
No. observations 720 690 720 690
No. Subjects 96 92 96 92
Wald χ2 180.92*** 213.38*** 225.20*** 241.27***
Log likelihood -1250.67 -2047.15 -1244.88 -2046.7
Notes: This table presents the estimates with Tobit random effects models. The dependent variable
is the intensity of a centralized sanction on Members 1, 2, and 3, which is left censored at zero.
Free-riding = max (0, Group average contribution - contribution). Robust standard errors (bootstrap)
are in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
In the first model specification, the coefficient of Dec punishment is negative and
significant for treatments with no corruptibility. It means that centralized sanctions
imposed by a non-corruptible enforcer are weakened by the presence of decentralized
punishment so that H1.2 is confirmed. But this significance does not hold for the
case with a corruptible enforcer, which does not support H2.2 that the presence of
decentralized punishment decreases centralized sanctions imposed by a corruptible
enforcer.
The coefficient of Free-riding is positive and significant for all cases, which indicates
Member 4 does punish a subject harder if the subject defects more. In the second
model specification, the coefficient of the interaction term between Dec punishment
and Free-riding is significant for treatments with no corruptibility. It means free-riding
induces a weaker centralized sanction of a non-corruptible enforcer with the presence
of decentralized punishment.
But is the weakening effect of decentralized punishment possibility strong enough
to lead to a much severer free-riding problem? I look at when a subject contributes
fewer than the group average contribution, whether the decrease in his second-stage
earnings dominates the increase in his first-stage earnings. Suppose Members 1, 2,
and 3 each contribute x. For each of them, the first-stage earnings are thus equal to
30 − x + 3x × 0.55 = 30 + 0.65x. If Member 1 contributes x − 3, then his first-stage
earnings will increase by 1.35 points.
In the NoCorrupt/NoDP treatment, if the gap between a free rider’s contribution
and the group average contribution increases by one point, the free rider’s second-
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stage earnings will decrease by 1.96 points.11 Since now Member 1’s contribution is
lower than the group average contribution by 2 points, his second-stage earnings will
decrease by 1.96× 2 = 3.92 points. Thus his total earnings in this period decrease by
3.92 − 1.35 = 2.57 points as a result of contributing fewer points. In other words, in
this case the empirical best response for Members 1, 2, and 3 is not to free ride.
In the NoCorrupt/DP treatment, if the gap between a free rider’s contribution
and the group average contribution increases by one point, his second-stage earnings
will decrease by 1.96 − 0.55 = 1.41 points. Now if Member 1 contributes x − 3, his
second earnings decrease by 1.41× 2 = 2.82 points. Thus his earnings during the first
two stages decrease by 2.82 − 1.35 = 1.47 points. On the one hand, the presence of
decentralized punishment decreases the effectiveness of centralized sanctions on free-
riding with 1.47 < 2.57. This drives the observation in Figure 3.1 that contributions
are lower in the NoCorrupt/DP treatment than in the NoCorrupt/NoDP treatment.
On the other hand, even though the centralized sanctions on free riders are weakened,
the empirical best response is not to free ride either with 1.47 > 0.
I then examine whether corruptive behaviors of Member 4 are different between the
two treatments with corruptibility. To be comparable with a centralized sanction on
per contributor, I divide the second-stage earnings of Member 4 by 3 to measure how
many points Member 4 “steals” from each contributor on average. Table 3.6 shows
that the average severities of corruption in the Corrupt/NoDP and the Corrupt/DP
treatments are 10.03 and 9.77 respectively. There is no significant difference between
the corruption severities in the two treatments (p-value = 1.00).








Notes: This table presents the average severities
of corruption by treatment. A unit of observa-
tion is an independent matching group. N is
the number of independent matching groups.
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
111.96 is the marginal effect of free-riding on the uncensored latent variable. It can be viewed as the




Notes: This figure presents the ratio centralized sanctions−corruptioncentralized sanctions over
periods by treatment with corruptibility, where corruption is measured
by the average number of points that Member 4 “steals” from each
other member and the intensity of centralized sanctions is equal to the
number of points a member loses in Stage 2 (same definitions as before).
Figure 3.2: The ratio of redistributions among contributors to centralized sanctions
In treatments with corruptibility, there are two purposes for Member 4 to take
points away from contributors, one being to increase her own earnings and the other
being to redistribute earnings among contributors. Thus centralized sanctions can be
divided into two parts: corruption and redistributions among contributors. Figure 3.2
shows that for both treatments, the ratios of redistributions to centralized sanctions
decrease saliently over periods. It means corruptible enforcers become greedier and
less responsible over time.
3.3.3 Decentralized Punishment
The hypotheses are based on the assumption about the retaliation incentive to “harm
those who let one suffer” (Nikiforakis 2008). I test this assumption by exploring
whether Members 1, 2, and 3 will deduct more points from the account of Member 4,
if they receive severer centralized sanctions. Table 3.7 presents the estimation results.
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Table 3.7: Tobit random effects estimates of determinants of punishment on Member
4
NoCorrupt/DP Corrupt/DP
Variables Punishment on Member 4 Punishment on Member 4






No. observations 330 300
No. subjects 44 40
Wald χ2 9.66*** 36.94***
Log likelihood -412.51 -503.14
Notes: This table presents the estimates with a Tobit random effects model.
The dependent variable is number of points deducted from the account of
Member 4, which is left censored at zero. Cen sanctions stands for the
intensity of the centralized sanction imposed upon the punisher. Robust
standard errors (bootstrap) are in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1
The coefficients of Cen sanctions in both treatments are positive and significant.
In the NoCorrupt/DP treatment, a one-point increase in the intensity of a centralized
sanction on the punisher increases his punishment on Member 4 by 0.681 points. In the
Corrupt/DP treatment, a one-point increase in the centralized sanction on the punisher
increases his punishment on Member 4 by 0.951 points. The two results confirm that
the level of decentralized punishment imposed upon the enforcer increases with the
intensity of preceding centralized sanctions on the peer punisher.
Members 1, 2, and 3 also impose punishment upon each other. In the NoCorrup-
t/DP treatment, around 60% of the total punishments by them are imposed upon
each other, and 2/3 of these punishments are targeted at free riders (see Table 3.12 in
appendix). In the NoCorrupt/NoDP treatment, the average intensity of the central-
ized sanctions on free riders is 7.35 points, which is reduced to 5.71 with the presence
of decentralized punishment.12 In the NoCorrupt/DP treatment, the average size of
the decentralized punishment on free riders by contributors is 4.30 points, which is
strong enough to offset the decrease in pro-social centralized sanctions. This can help
explain why contributions do not decrease significantly with the presence of decentral-
ized punishment in the case with a non-corruptible enforcer, even though the intensity
of centralized sanctions decreases.
In the Corrupt/DP treatment, around 80% of the punishments by Members 1,
2, and 3 are imposed on Member 4 and most of these punishments can be counted
12The average intensity is equal to the total intensity of centralized sanctions on free riders divided




as counter-punishment. This is consistent with the fact that the embezzlement and
anti-social sanctions of Member 4 substantially impair other members’ benefits and
generate great inequality. Driven by both the retaliation incentive and the aversion to
inequality, contributors impose severe punishment on Member 4.
3.3.4 Welfare
The previous experimental evidences are mixed about whether first-order or second-
order decentralized punishment increases or decreases net earnings. Most studies find
that decentralized punishment marginally increases or does not affect net earnings
(e.g. Ostrom et al. 1992; Page et al. 2005; Nikiforakis 2008) and some find that
decentralized punishment lowers net earnings (e.g. Fehr and Gächter 2000, 2002;
Sefton et al. 2007).
So far I have shown that the presence of decentralized punishment is not helpful
to cooperation in cases with a centralized enforcer. Combined with the fact that
decentralized punishment induces a cost, it is not surprising to see that welfare is
reduced by the presence of decentralized punishment. Table 3.8 presents the average
period earnings by treatment.
Table 3.8: Average period earnings by treatment
Treatments No corruptibility Corruptibility p-value Row total
No decentralized punishment
42.80 (4.34) 40.70 (2.82) 41.75 (3.62)
N=5 N=5 0.25 N = 10
Decentralized punishment
34.65 (4.87) 30.79 (3.51) 32.93 (4.54)
N=5 N=4 0.22 N = 9
p-value 0.05 0.01 0.002
Column total
38.72 (6.11) 36.30 (6.00) 37.57 (6.01)
N= 10 N=9 0.34 N=19
Notes: This table presents the average period earnings of each subject by treatment. A unit
of observation is an independent matching group. N is the number of independent matching
groups. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
The average period earnings across all the treatments are 37.57 points. In the
NoCorrupt/DP treatment, the average period earnings are 34.65, which are lower
than the earnings in the NoCorrupt/NoDP treatment (42.80). Also, the average period
earnings are lower in the Corrupt/DP treatment (30.79) than in the Corrupt/NoDP
treatment (40.70). And both differences are significant (p-value ≤ 0.05), indicating
that the presence of (second-order) decentralized punishment erodes welfare in the
social dilemma regulated by a centralized enforcer. Corruptibility also reduces welfare,




A question that has not been answered lies in the comparison between the two treat-
ments with corruptibility, that is, what drives the decrease in contributions with the
possibility of decentralized punishment. Ignoring complicated interactions between
contributions, centralized sanctions, and decentralized punishment, I look at the cor-
relation between contributions and period earnings of contributors. Table 3.9 presents
the result.
Table 3.9: Linear random effects estimates for period earnings
Corrupt/NoDP Corrupt/DP







No. observations 390 300
No. subjects 52 40
Wald χ2 38.17*** 36.94***
Notes: This table presents the estimates with a linear
random effects model. The dependent variable is the
period earnings for Members 1, 2, and 3. Robust stan-
dard errors (bootstrap) are in parentheses. ***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
The coefficient of Contribution is significant and positive for the Corrupt/NoDP
treatment but not for the Corrupt/DP treatment. I also pool the data of the two
treatments and find that the coefficient of the interaction term between the treatment
dummy and Contribution is significant (p-value < 0.001). In other words, high con-
tributions are profitable for the subjects in the Corrupt/NoDP treatment, but not
for those in the Corrupt/DP treatment. So subjects should contribute more in the
Corrupt/NoDP treatment than in the Corrupt/DP treatment.
There can be two reasons for why the correlation between contributions and period
earnings is different between the two treatments. One is that subjects in the Corrup-
t/DP treatment implement severe anti-social punishment on cooperators in the third
stage. But in this treatment, the percentage of the decentralized punishment on co-
operators is only 9%, which can hardly explain the decrease in contributions. The
other possible reason is that the enforcer in the Corrupt/DP treatment implements
less pro-social centralized sanctions compared to the Corrupt/NoDP treatment. I test
the correlation between contributions and a contributor’s total earnings during the
first two stages for the Corrupt/DP treatment. The coefficient of Contribution is also
insignificant, which indicates that the enforcer in the Corrupt/DP treatment does not
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redistribute earnings among contributors in a pro-social way.
Why does a corruptible enforcer implement less pro-social centralized sanctions
with the possibility of decentralized punishment? In other words, why is a corrupt-
ible enforcer less responsible for improving cooperation with the possibility of getting
punished? A responsibility-alleviation effect may be an explanation. Charness (2000)
argues that shifting responsibility for an outcome to an external authority dampens
internal impulses towards honesty, loyalty, or generosity. Charness et al. (2012) show
that without bearing the duty of setting salaries, workers provide lower effort levels.
There are some other related arguments. Barkema (1995) provides empirical evidence
that executive performance is worse with close supervision. Griffith (1993) finds that
unless monitoring is active, performance under physical monitoring is lower than with
no monitoring.
In this study, a corruptible enforcer may initially have a sense of duty to improve
cooperation. Even though the enforcer embezzles money, she acts in a relatively pro-
social way, e.g. taking away fewer points from the accounts of cooperators than from
the accounts of free riders. But when other members can informally monitor and
regulate the corruptible enforcer, she might feel that her authority is challenged. She no
longer cares about whether cooperators earn more points than free riders do, since she
expects to be retaliated by all other members anyway due to her corruptive behaviors.
In summary, with a limited and non-deterrent level, the possibility of punishing a
corruptible enforcer may even worsen the situation by weakening her responsibility
perception.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper uses experiments to study the effects of decentralized punishment possibil-
ity on centralized sanctions for both non-corruptible and corruptible enforcers as well
as cooperation under their regulations. The results are mixed.
For a non-corruptible enforcer, her centralized sanctions are weakened by the pos-
sibility of decentralized punishment as predicted, but contributions do not decrease
significantly. This result is in line with the outcome in Balafoutas et al. (2014). They
study the effect of counter-punishment on the effectiveness of third-party punishment.
Each third-party punisher can also be viewed as a non-corruptible centralized enforcer.
They find that cooperation does not decrease substantially, even though the willing-
ness of third-party punishers to sanction free riders is decreased by the possibility of
counter-punishment.
The counter-punishment effect on the effectiveness of a non-corruptible centralized
institution seems weaker than that on the effectiveness of decentralized punishment,
since the latter effect proves to be significantly negative (e.g. Denant-Boemont et
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al. 2007; Nikiforakis 2008). It could be that the retaliation incentive for a peer’s
punishment is stronger than that for a non-corruptible enforcer’s sanctions, because
subjects may consider centralized sanctions to be more authorized and impartial.
For a corruptible enforcer, the intensity of centralized sanctions does not change,
but the pro-sociality of her centralized sanctions is reduced by the possibility of retal-
iating the enforcer, which leads to lower contributions. This result is different from
what is found by Van Leeuwen et al. (2015). They study the effect of ostracism on
cooperativeness when there is a leader distributing the group output and find that
cooperativeness is increased by the presence of ostracism.
There are two major differences between our designs which may drive the different
result. One is that Van Leeuwen et al. (2015) use partners matching while I use s-
trangers matching. The other difference is that in their study players can fully exclude
the authority by majority voting, while in my study players can only limitedly reduce
the payoff of the enforcer.
3.6 Appendix
3.6.A Instructions
A.1 Instructions for the Corrupt/DP treatment
Welcome to our experiment. Please follow the instructions carefully.
The experiment consists of 10 periods. At the end of the experiment you will be paid
your earnings of one period, which will be randomly selected. In each period, your
earnings depend on your decisions and the decisions of other participants. During
the experiment your earnings are denoted in points and its exchange rate is 4 points
= 1 Euro. You will receive your final earnings by bank transfer within three working
days after the experiment.
At the beginning of each period, participants will be randomly (re)assigned to groups
of 4 members. Then the four members in a group are randomly assigned to be
Member 1, Member 2, Member 3, and Member 4. Members 1, 2 and 3 are each given
an endowment of 30 points and Member 4 is given an endowment of 20 points.
Each period proceeds with three stages.
Stage 1
Members 1, 2 and 3 each decide how much of their endowment they want to
contribute to the group account. Member 4 does not make a decision in this stage.
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The return from the group account depends on the total amount of points that
Members 1, 2 and 3 contribute. Specifically, every point a member contributes to the
group account gives each group member a return of 0.55 points.
Hence, the earnings of group members in the first stage can be expressed as follows.
1st Stage Earnings (Members 1, 2 and 3) = 30 - (this member’s contribution to the
group account) + 0.55 * (total group contribution to the group account).
1st Stage Earnings (Member 4) = 20 + 0.55 * (total group contribution to the group
account);
At the end of this stage, group members are informed how many points each member
has contributed to the group account and about each member’s 1st stage earnings.
Stage 2
Members 1, 2 and 3 do not make a decision in this stage.
Member 4 first chooses how many points to collect from all members in her or his
group, and then decides how to allocate the collected points among all members in
her or his group. Points collected from a member range between zero and (1st stage
earnings of that member - 10). In other words, each member at least keeps 10 points
in her or his account.
2nd stage earnings can be expressed as follows:
2nd Stage Earnings = - (points that are collected from this member by Member 4) +
(points that are allocated to this member by Member 4);
Note that the total number of points collected from all group members by Member 4,
should be equal to the total number of points that are allocated to all group
members by Member 4.
At the end of this stage, group members are informed of Member 4’s collection and
allocation decisions, and the 2nd stage earnings of each member.
Stage 3
All group members each decide how many points to deduct from other members.
Each point that you deduct from other members costs you 1/3 points. The total
number of points that you deduct from other members cannot exceed 3 * (your 1st
stage earnings + your 2nd stage earnings).
The earnings of group members in this stage can be expressed as follows.
3rd Stage Earnings = - (total points that are deducted from this member) - (1/3)*
67
Chapter 3
(total points this member deducts from other members)
At the end of this stage, group members are informed of their 3rd stage deduction
decisions and earnings.
Earnings of a Period
Earnings of a period = 1st Stage Earnings + 2nd Stage Earnings +3rd Stage
Earnings
At the end of each period, group members are informed about their earnings of the
current period.
Summary
• The experiment lasts for 10 periods.
• One period will be randomly chosen to determine your earnings.
• Your earnings in a period are determined by your own decisions and the decisions
of other participants.
• At the beginning of each period, participants will be randomly (re)assigned to
groups of 4 members. Then the four members in a group are randomly assigned
to be Member 1, Member 2, Member 3, and Member 4.
• Each period consists of three stages.
• Earnings in the first stage are determined by the number of points Members 1,
2 and 3 contribute to the group account.
• Earnings in the second stage are determined by the points which Member 4
collects from, and allocates to, all members in her or his group.
• Earnings in the third stage are determined by the points that are deducted by
and from group members.
• After each stage, group members are informed about all the decisions made in
that stage and the corresponding earnings.
• Earnings of the period are the sum of the earnings in the three stages.
Procedure and Questions
After reading the instructions, you will be asked to answer a few control questions to
check your understanding. The first period of the experiment will start as soon as
all the participants have correctly answered the control questions. At the end of the
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experiment, please wait until your seat number is called and fill in payment details.
Please be quiet during the entire experiment and do not talk to other participants. If
you have a question, please raise your hand and you will be answered privately.
A.2 Summary of Instructions for the NoCorrupt/NoDP treatment
• The experiment lasts for 10 periods.
• One period will be randomly chosen to determine your earnings.
• Your earnings in a period are determined by your own decisions and the decisions
of other participants.
• At the beginning of each period, participants will be randomly (re)assigned to
groups of 4 members. Then the four members in a group are randomly assigned
to be Member 1, Member 2, Member 3, and Member 4.
• Each period consists of two stages.
• Earnings in the first stage are determined by the number of points Members 1,
2 and 3 contribute to the group account.
• Earnings in the second stage are determined by the points which Member 4
collects from, and allocates to, Members 1, 2 and 3.
• After each stage, group members are informed about all the decisions made in
that stage and the corresponding earnings.
• Earnings of the period are the sum of the earnings in the two stages.
A.3 Summary of Instructions for the NoCorrupt/DP treatment
• The experiment lasts for 10 periods.
• One period will be randomly chosen to determine your earnings.
• Your earnings in a period are determined by your own decisions and the decisions
of other participants.
• At the beginning of each period, participants will be randomly (re)assigned to
groups of 4 members. Then the four members in a group are randomly assigned
to be Member 1, Member 2, Member 3, and Member 4.
• Each period consists of three stages.
• Earnings in the first stage are determined by the number of points Members 1,
2 and 3 contribute to the group account.
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• Earnings in the second stage are determined by the points which Member 4
collects from, and allocates to, Members 1, 2 and 3.
• Earnings in the third stage are determined by the points that are deducted by
and from group members.
• After each stage, group members are informed about all the decisions made in
that stage and the corresponding earnings.
• Earnings of the period are the sum of the earnings in the three stages.
A.4 Summary of Instructions for the Corrupt/NoDP treatment
• The experiment lasts for 10 periods.
• One period will be randomly chosen to determine your earnings.
• Your earnings in a period are determined by your own decisions and the decisions
of other participants.
• At the beginning of each period, participants will be randomly (re)assigned to
groups of 4 members. Then the four members in a group are randomly assigned
to be Member 1, Member 2, Member 3, and Member 4.
• Each period consists of two stages.
• Earnings in the first stage are determined by the number of points Members 1,
2 and 3 contribute to the group account.
• Earnings in the second stage are determined by the points which Member 4
collects from, and allocates to, all members in her or his group.
• After each stage, group members are informed about all the decisions made in
that stage and the corresponding earnings.
• Earnings of the period are the sum of the earnings in the two stages.
3.6.B An Equilibrium Analysis
The equilibrium analysis below is based on the utility model by Fehr and Schmidt
(1999), which can be given by
Ui = πi − αi
∑
i 6=jmax{πj − πi, 0} − βi
∑
i 6=jmax{πi − πj, 0},
αi ≥ 0, βi ≥ 0, βi < αi.13
13In Fehr and Schmidt (1999), the utility is expressed as Ui = πi − αin−1
∑




i 6=jmax?{πi−πj , 0} and n is the number of group members. For the convenience of expression,
the part of n in the present analysis is dismissed.
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Proposition 1: If αi ≤ 1.325, where i = 1, 2, 3, in the NoCorrupt/NoDP treatment
there exists a cooperative subgame perfect Nash equilibrium as follows:
1) In Stage 1, Members 1, 2, and 3 each contribute 30 points, that is, c1 = c2 =
c3 = 30.
2) In Stage 2,













b.2. if 30 ≤
∑3
i=1 ci ≤ 40/0.45, Member 4 redistributes earnings such that πf = 50−
0.45
∑3
i=1 ci and πi 6=f = π4 = 20 + 0.55
∑3
i=1 ci, where i = f is the lowest contributor,
that is, cf = min{c1, c2, c3};
b.3. if
∑3
i=1 ci > 40/0.45, Member 4 redistributes earnings such that πf = 10
and πi 6=f = (80 + 0.65
∑3
i=1 ci)/2, where i = f is the lowest contributor, that is,
cf = min{c1, c2, c3}.
Proof
First, I show that a one-shot deviation from full contribution is NOT profitable in
Stage 1.
Assume c2 = c3 = 30 so that
∑3
i=1 ci = 60 + c1.
i) If c1 = 30, then π1 = π2 = π3 = 49.5, π4 = 69.5.
U1 = 49.5− α1(69.5− 49.5) = 49.5− 20α1.
ii) If Member 1 deviates to c1 ≤ 40/0.45− 60, then π1 = 23− 0.45c1, π2 = π3 = π4 =
53 + 0.55c1.
U1 = 23− 0.45c1 − 3α1(53 + 0.55c1 − 23 + 0.45c1)
= 23− 3α1c1 − 0.45c1 − 90c1 ≤ 23.
The condition for 49.5− 20α1 ≥ 23 is α1 ≤ 1.325.14
iii) If Member 1 deviates to 30 > c1 > 40/0.45 − 60, then π1 = 10, π2 = π3 =
(119 + 0.65c1)/2.
14Fehr and Schmidt (1999) suggest a simple discrete distribution of αi and βi based on large exper-
imental evidence they have on the ultimatum game. According the suggested discrete distribution,
it is very unlikely that αi with groups of four members exceeds 1.3.
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U1 = 10− α1(53 + 0.55c1 − 10)− 2α1[(119 + 0.65c1)/2− 10]
= 10− 142α1 − 1.1α1c1 ≤ 10.
The condition for 49.5− 20α1 ≥ 10 is α1 ≤ 1.975.
Second, I argue that one-shot deviations from equilibrium strategies in Stage 2 are
NOT profitable for Member 4 either.
In cases a. and b.1, equally redistributing earnings among Member 1, 2, and 3 does
not hurt Member 4 anyway, since the inequality in earnings is not increased.
In cases b.2 and b.3, the average payoff of Members 1, 2, and 3 is lower than
that of Member 4. So long as a redistributing strategy of Member 4 does not make
any other’s earnings higher than hers, the strategy won’t be worse than an equal
division (among Members 1, 2, and 3). The reason is that the advantageous inequality
of Member 4 is the same as with an equal redistribution and the disadvantageous
inequality she faces is zero. For b.3, it is easy to check that when
∑3
i=1 c1 > 40/0.45,
πi 6=f = (80 + 0.65
∑3
i=1 ci)/2 < π4 = 20 + 0.55
∑3
i=1 ci.







Proposition 2: Considering the case in which αi ≥ 0.5, in the NoCorrupt/DP treat-
ment the strategy profile in the following cannot be sustained as a subgame perfect
equilibrium:
1) In Stages 1 and 2, the strategies are the same as displayed in Proposition 1.
2) In Stage 3, the members who earn the fewest points during the first two stages
punish all other members such that the final earnings of all members are equal.
Proof
Notice that if no one is sufficiently concerned about disadvantageous inequality (αi <
0.5), it is always a best response for players not to punish in Stage 3. Then there is
no difference between the cases with and without the decentralized punishment pos-
sibility. For a simple and more interesting discussion, here I only consider the case
in which all members are sufficiently concerned about inequality (αi > 0.5). I check
whether the strategy profile described in Proposition 2 can be sustained as a subgame
perfect equilibrium.
First, I show that a one-shot deviation from full contribution in Stage 1 is NOT prof-
itable for Members 1, 2, and 3.
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Assume c2 = c3 = 30 so that
∑3
i=1 ci = 60 + c1.

















Each of Members 1, 2, and 3 imposes punishment pi4 on Member 4 such that
π1 = π4 =⇒ 49.5− pi4/3 = 69.5− 3pi4 =⇒ pi4 = 7.5 =⇒ U1 = π1 = 47.







4 = 53 + 0.55c1.
Then Member 1 punishes all three other members such that
π1 = π4 = 23− 0.45c1 − p14 = 53 + 0.55c1 − p14.
There is no such feasible punishment. At most, Member 1 can punish others until
he uses up his total earnings during the first two stages. Thus his utility must be
non-positive.
iii) If Member 1 deviates to 30 > c1 > 40/0.45− 60, then π11 + π21 = 10.
Member 1 can only punish up to the budget constraint such that p12 + p13 + p14 = 10
and his final utility must be non-positive.
Second, a one-shot deviation from equally redistributing in Stage 2 on the normal path
(c1 = c2 = c3 = 30) is NOT profitable for Member 4 since the deviation won’t reduce
inequality or others’ punishment on her in the third stage.
Third, I demonstrate that a one-shot deviation to no redistribution in Stage 2 on the
punishment path (c1 < 30) CAN be profitable for Member 4.
i) If 30 > c1 > 40/0.45− 60, then π11 + π21 = 10, π12 + π22 = π13 + π23 = (119 + 0.65c1)/2,
π14 + π
2
4 = 53 + 0.55c1.
For simplicity, consider the case of c1 = 29.
max(p14) = 30 =⇒ min(π4) = 38.95
=⇒ min(U4) = 38.95(1− β4)− (119 + 0.65× 29− 38.95× 2)α4
=⇒ min(U4) = 38.95(1− β4)− 59.95α4.
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Members 2 and 3 together punish Member 1 and 4 in Stage 3 with p21 = p31 and
p24 = p34, such that
π2 = π3 = 48.95− p24/3− p21/3 = π4 = 68.95− 2p24 = π1 = 49.95− 2p21
=⇒ p21 = p31 = 3.125, p24 = p34 = 12.625
=⇒ U4 = π4 = 43.7 > 38.95 > 38.95(1− β4)− 59.95α4.
So a one-shot deviation to no redistribution in the second stage can be profitable for
Member 4. This strategy profile cannot be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium
in the NoCorrupt/DP treatment.





Proposition 3.1: If β4 ≥ 0.25, in the Corrupt/NoDP treatment a cooperative equi-
librium can be sustained in which Members 1, 2, and 3 each contribute 30 points and




Proposition 3.2: If β4 < 0.25 and αi > 0, there exists a unique subgame equilibrium
in which no one contributes any point and Member 4 always allocates as many points




The equilibrium strategy for Member 4 is mainly dependent on β4. Suppose the
proportion of earnings that the enforcer keep for him/herself is k and each contributor
gets one third of remaining earnings. And it should be that k ≥ (1 − k)/3 since
α4 > β4.









If (1 − 4β4) ≤ 0, it is not profitable for Member 4 to allocate a larger share to her-
self. More specifically, if β4 ≥ 0.25, a cooperative equilibrium can be sustained that
Members 1, 2, and 3 each contribute 30 points and Member 4 equally redistributes
earnings among all members such that πi = (110 + 1.2
∑3
i=1 ci)/4.
If β4 < 0.25, the equilibrium should be that Members 1, 2, and 3 each contribute
zero and Member 4 always allocates as many points as possible to herself such that
π4 = 110 + 1.2
∑3
i=1 ci − 10× 3 = 80 + 1.2
∑3











Proposition 4: Considering the case in which αi ≥ 0.5, if β4 ≥ 0.148, in the Cor-
rupt/DP treatment a cooperative equilibrium can be sustained in which
1) In Stage 1, Members 1, 2, and 3 each contribute 30 points,
2) In Stage 2, Member 4 equally redistributes earnings among all members such that
πi = (110 + 1.2
∑3
i=1 ci)/4,
3) In Stage 3, the members who earned the fewest points in the first two stages punishes
all other members such that everyone make the same final earnings.
Proof
First, a one-shot deviation from full contribution in Stage 1 is NOT profitable, s-
ince Member 4 always equally redistribute earnings among all members so that πi =
(110 + 1.2
∑3
i=1 ci)/4 is monotonically increasing with one’s own contribution.
Second, I derive the condition in which a one-shot deviation from equally redistributing
among all group members on the normal path (c1 = c2 = c3 = 30) is NOT profitable
for Member 4.
i) If Member 4 equally redistribute earnings among all members,
U4 = π4 = 54.5.
















Then in Stage 3, all three contributors punish Member 4 (p14 = p24 = p34).
π1 = π4 =⇒ 49.5− p14/3 = 69.5− 3p14 =⇒ p14 = 7.5 =⇒ U4 = π4 = 47 < 54.5.
iii) If Member 4 deviates to embezzlement, leaving each contributor with only 10
















p14 = p24 = p34 = 30 =⇒ π4 = 188− 30× 3 = 98
U4 = 98− 3β4 × 98
98− 3β4 × 98 ≤ 54.5 =⇒ β4 ≥ 0.148.
In summary, only if β4 ≥ 0.148, a one-shot deviation from an equal redistribution to
the severest embezzlement is NOT profitable for Member 4 on the normal path.
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Third, I derive the condition in which a one-shot deviation from the strategy of an
equal redistribution on a punishment path (c1 < 30) is not profitable for Member 4.
i) If Member 4 equally redistributes earnings among all members,
U4 = π4 = (110 + 1.2
∑3
i=1 ci)/4 = 45.5 + 0.3c1.
ii) If Member 4 deviates to no redistribution,
π11 + π
2











4 = 53 + 0.55c1
.
In Stage 3, Members 2 and 3 together punish Members 1 and 4 (p21 = p31, p24 = p34)
33 + 0.55c1 − (p21 + p24)/3 = 63− 0.45c1 − 2p21 = 53 + 0.55c1 − 2p24
=⇒ p24 = (130− c1)/4 =⇒ U4 = π4 = 20.5 + 0.8c1
(45.5 + 0.3c1)− (20.5 + 0.8c1) = 25− 0.5c1 > 0




4 = 80 + 1.2
∑3












Then three contributors together punish Member 4 (p14 = p24 = p34 = 30)
π4 = 152 + 1.2c1 − 30× 3 = 62 + 1.2c1
U4 = (1− 3β4)(62 + 1.2c1)
D = (45.5 + 0.3c1)− (1− 3β4)(62 + 1.2c1) = 186β4 + (3.6β4 − 0.9)c1 − 16.5
The larger β4 is, the more likely D is to be positive. Besides, when 3.6β4 − 0.9 < 0
(β4 < 0.25), D decreases as c1 increases so that D reaches the lowest level when
c1 = 30. I check as follows:
if β4 = 0.25, then D = 30 > 0;
if β4 ≥ 0.25,then D ≥ 30 > 0;
if β4 < 0.25, then D(c1 = 30) = 294β4 − 43.5 ≥ 0 =⇒ if 0.25 > β4 ≥ 0.148, then
D > 0.
In summary, only if β4 ≥ 0.148, a one-shot deviation from an equal redistribution on
a punishment path (c1 < 30) is NOT profitable for Member 4.
So for this strategy profile to be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium in the
Corrupt/DP treatment, we need β4 ≥ 0.148. In contrast, the condition is β4 ≥ 0.25 in
the Corrupt/NoDP treatment. 15
15Fehr and Schmidt (1999) suggest a simple discrete distribution in which Prob(βi = 0) = 30%,




Table 3.10: Average contributions by treatment
Treatments No corruptibility Corruptibility p-value Row total
No Decentralized Punishment
17.00 (4.82) 14.66 (3.13) 15.83 (4.02)
N=5 N=5 0.25 N = 10
Decentralized punishment
15.57 (2.94) 10.90 (3.31) 13.49 (3.80)
N=5 N=4 0.05 N = 9
p-value 0.6 0.14 0.29
Column total
16.29 (3.83) 12.99 (3.60) 14.72 (4.00)
N= 10 N=9 0.06 N=19
Notes: This table presents average contributions per contributor by treatment with more
results being reported. A unit of observation is an independent matching group. N is the
number of independent matching groups. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Table 3.11: Average intensities of centralized sanctions by treatment
Treatments No corruptibility Corruptibility p-value Row total
No decentralized punishment
3.49 (1.17) 11.72 (4.85) 7.60 (5.46)
N=5 N=5 0.01 N = =10
Decentralized punishment
3.03 (1.23) 10.61 (3.79) 6.40 (4.70)
N=5 N=4 0.01 N = 9
p-Value 0.35 0.81 0.51
Column total
3.26 (1.16) 11.22 (4.18) 7.03 (5.01)
N= 10 N=9 0.00 N=19
Notes: This table presents average intensities of centralized sanctions on each contributor
by treatment with more results being reported. A unit of observation is an independent




Table 3.12: Decentralized punishment imposed by contributors




on perverse sanctions 30 (1.7%)
on omission 25 (1.4%)
others 233 (13.2%)
Members 1, 2, 3





on perverse sanctions 0 (0.0%)
on omission 14.6 (0.8%)
others 114.4 (6.4%)
Members 1, 2, 3
on free riders 244 (13.6%)
others 85 (4.7%)
Notes: This table reports the sizes of decentralized punishment by type of punishments.
The sizes of decentralized punishment are measured by the numbers of points deducted
from the accounts of subjects who are punished in the third stage. The corresponding
percentages are in parentheses. Counter-punishment stands for the punishment upon
Member 4 if the punisher’s second-stage earnings are negative. Punishment on perverse
sanctions denotes the punishment upon Member 4 if the punisher’s second-stage earnings
are non-negative and the second-stage earnings of cooperator(s) are negative. Punishment
on omission denotes the punishment upon Member 4 if the punisher’s second-stage
earnings are non-negative and the second-stage earnings of free rider(s) are non-negative.
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The Effect of Interactions with Out-group
Members on In-group-Out-group Differences:
An Experimental Study
4.1 Introduction
Groups are ubiquitous features of our social lives. A great challenge to organizations,
communities, and societies is that people sometimes discriminate between in-group
and out-group members. Attitudinal and perceptual gaps in favor of in-group members
over out-group members, which are also called in-group-out-group differences, are well-
documented by a number of laboratory studies (Tajfel et al. 1971; Brewer 1979;
Bernhard et al. 2006; Goette et al. 2006; Charness et al. 2007; Chen and Li 2009;
Sutter 2009; Currarini and Mengel 2016). This paper studies whether interactions
with out-group members matter for in-group-out-group differences and whether the
nature of these interactions matters for in-group-out-group differences.
It is not unusual to observe that people interact with out-group members in daily
life. Suppose that a local competed with an immigrant for a job position. Will she
view immigrants in a more hostile way? Or if she cooperated with an immigrant in
a charity activity, will she treat immigrants more favorably? There are also a lot of
examples in the field of sports, e.g. tennis players from different countries compete
for a prize in a professional match. Do these competitions lead to more aggressive
attitudes or behaviors toward their opponents’ countries? Interaction with out-group
members can even occur without direct and personal contacts. For instance, if two
persons from different communities (know that they) both donated to a charity, will
they feel closer to the people from the other community in general? Or if they bid
for a precious CD on eBay, will they develop unpleasant feelings towards people from
the other community. All these real-life examples inspire us to have a look at whether
interactions with out-group members can matter for in-group-out-group differences.
Related to our study, there have been previous attempts to explore the effect of
contact on the attitude toward a specific social group. On the one hand, positive con-
tacts may reduce prejudice over out-groups. Van Oudenhoven et al. (1996) find that
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when the ethnic background of Turkish participants is made salient, the mean attitude
of Dutch participants toward Turkish people is more favorable after they cooperated
with Turkish participants on some tasks. Brown et al. (1999) show that after coop-
erative contacts with German participants, British participants view Germans more
favorably in some positive dimensions, e.g. hardworking and efficient, provided that
typical German participants were encountered. Adachi et al. (2016) demonstrate that
after players played cooperatively with “suspicious” players from another university in
violent video games, their out-group attitudes are improved.
On the other hand, negative contacts can lead to a more hostile attitude toward
out-groups. Labianca et al. (1998) find that negative (interpersonal) relationships
between employees from different departments of a company are positively correlated
with higher perceived intergroup conflicts between departments. Brown et al. (2001)
ask each British participant to describe a specific French person that he knows and
to assess the nature of his contact with the French person in various dimensions, e.g.
acquaintance, cooperative or conflictual, informal or formal, frequency. They find
that if these contacts are rated as conflictual, participants on average exhibit more
aggressive attitudes toward French.
We examine whether the effects on in-group-out-group differences of “personal”
contact extend to an environment with “impersonal” interaction. We conduct a labo-
ratory experiment in which subjects are randomly assigned to either a Red group or a
Blue group and make distributional choices after having engaged in an interaction with
an out-group member. We manipulate the nature of interactions with out-group mem-
bers by imposing different payment structures for a real-effort task. In the competitive
and cooperative treatments, subjects’ earnings for the task are calculated in competi-
tive and cooperative ways respectively. We also include a baseline treatment in which
earnings are calculated in a piece rate. After the real-effort task, each subject is asked
to make a series of choices on allocations between herself and another subject, either
from in-group or out-group (Chen and Li 2009; Currarini and Mengel 2016). The gaps
between their choices when they are faced with in-group and out-group members can
be identified as in-group-out-group differences. Our design allows us to examine how
these differences vary with the nature of interactions.
Allport (1954) suggests that to be effective in reducing prejudice over out-groups,
contact needs to be “personal”. Otherwise, people learn little about each other and
intergroup friendships cannot occur. And according to a well-known meta study by
Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) who include 713 independent samples from 515 studies,
subjects in these studies at least get a chance to know with whom they interact or
even have a real talk in the process of contact.1 In our paper, an environment with
1Contacts range from temporary and structured conversations or activities in a lab setting, to sus-
tained interventions (e.g. discussions on a specific topic or a joint trip) or encounters (e.g. interracial
college roommates) in naturalistic environment.
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“impersonal” interactions only imposes abstract (economic) interdependence between
subjects. Besides, Allport (1954) points out that cooperation for a common goal is an
important condition for contact to reduce prejudice saliently. Thus we in particular
test whether the effect of the “impersonal” interaction is also positive in reducing
in-group-out-group differences if the interaction involves cooperation for a common
goal but not (or even is negative) if the interaction involves competition for a scarce
resource.
Our paper is also related to studies on the effects of intergroup relations on in-
group-out-group differences. For example, Bettencourt et al. (1998) let participants
from two minimal groups work together on a task in either an intergroup competitive
condition or an intergroup cooperative condition. Afterwards, participants are asked
to rate each person’s contribution and friendliness in the task. Their results indicate
that competitive teams exhibit a higher level of in-group favoritism than cooperative
teams do.2 Goette et al. (2012) employ a two-stage game consisting a simultaneous
prisoner’s dilemma (PD) and then a third-party punishment game. In a condition
of intergroup competition, a bonus is offered to each member from the group which
got the highest total payoff in the PD. It is found that in-group favoritism in both
cooperation and punishment is increased by intergroup competition.3 In these studies,
interactions are imposed directly between groups. In contrast, our paper focuses on
interactions that occur between (two) persons from different groups. We examine
whether the effect of interpersonal interactions can be generalized to group levels.
Our experimental results show that there is a difference in altruism between towards
in-group and out-group members only when subjects receive higher earnings than their
matched players do. Also, we demonstrate that cooperative interactions with out-
group members decrease the in-group-out-group difference in altruism when subjects
receive higher earnings than their matched players do, but competitive interactions
do not affect it. When subjects receive lower earnings than their matched players do,
their decisions are not affected by these interactions.
2Without a control group, they cannot tell which side (competitive or cooperative) drives the
change in in-group-out-group differences. With a control group, our paper can make a conclusion
about the driving source.
3In their study, the competitive condition increases the marginal benefit of favoring in-group
members, even though the dominant strategy is to defect in both the competitive and baseline con-
ditions. Our study separates the stage of interaction and the stage of measuring in-group-out-group
differences, capturing a “spill-over” effect of interaction on in-group-out-group differences.
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4.2 Experimental Design, Hypotheses and Proce-
dure
4.2.1 Design
At the beginning of the experiment, the computer randomly assigns half of the subjects
to the Red group and the other half to the Blue group. Red and Blue are meaningless
labels. Subjects cannot communicate with each other. They won’t know who will be
in their own group or the other group. Also, subjects have no vested interest in serving
their own group. We therefore use a “truly” minimal group paradigm.4
After the assignment of groups, there are three parts and a questionnaire. In part
1, subjects are asked to make a series of calculations within one minute. For each
calculation, a subject sees four single-digit numbers. Two of them are in Red color
and the other two in Blue color. The subject needs to sum up the two numbers in
the same color as their group label. The computer quietly keeps track of the number
of correct answers. The main purpose of the calculation task is to have efforts that
generate earnings. The color of the numbers can serve as a priming tool to let subjects
perceive their color-relevant group membership more saliently.
The earnings for this calculation task are then computed in different ways for dif-
ferent treatments. There are three treatments: neutral, cooperative, and competitive.
In the neutral treatment, each subject earns 20 tokens for each correct answer she
has, that is, she gets a piece-rate payment. In both the cooperative and competitive
treatments, each subject is matched with an out-group member. For the cooperative
treatment, the two subjects in a matched pair each earn 10 tokens for each correct
answer based on the total number of correct answers they have. For the competitive
treatment, a subject’s earnings depend on whether she wins against the matched out-
group member. The winner earns 40 tokens for each correct answer she has, while the
loser earns nothing.5
There is a potential concern for implementing a cooperative payment structure
based on the total number of correct answers. Subjects may not believe that the
matched player makes as much effort as possible. In this sense, we cannot be sure that
subjects perceive salient cooperativeness with the matched player. But other forms
of a cooperative payment structure cannot perform better or theoretically even worse.
For example, based on the minimum or maximum number of their correct answers,
4Since Tajfel et al. (1971), quite a few experimental studies on in-group-out-group differences have
used the approach of assigning “minimal” groups by their preference of painting or some other ways
which generate a mild sense of similarity with in-group members.
5In practice, we applied stochastic payment to the neutral and cooperative treatments, that is,
only half of the subjects were randomly chosen by the computer to actually get paid. The rewards
for each correct answer in the two treatments were then doubled compared to the original rewards.
In this way, closer payoff distributions are generated for all treatments.
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we cannot rule out the possibility that subjects shirk either. So long as the cost of
making an effort is positive, under the “minimum” payoff structure there always exists
an equilibrium in which both subjects shirk, and under the “maximum” payment
structure there does not exist a symmetric equilibrium in which both subjects make
every effort. In contrast, making every effort is the dominant strategy for subjects
under the “total” payment structure, as long as making an effort is beneficial for the
subject individually, that is, her personal cost of doing a calculation is lower than 20
tokens.
In part 2, each subject makes a number of choices on allocations of tokens be-
tween herself and another subject. In half of the experimental sessions, each subject is
matched with a randomly selected subject from her own group (in-group matching);
in the other half of the sessions, each subject is matched with a randomly selected sub-
ject from the other group (out-group matching). In the cooperative and competitive
treatments, the member to whom each subject is matched now is different from the
member to whom she was matched in part 1. We set 21 choice problems that each has
an option X and an option Y. For each of these problems, subjects are asked to choose
option X or option Y. Each option defines how many tokens they and their matched
players will get if they choose that option.
For a specific measure of altruism, we refer to the model in Charness and Rabin
(2002), which generalizes various social preferences with two parameters, ρ and σ.
They capture to what extent a person cares for the other person’s payoff when she gets a
higher payoff and a lower payoff than the other person does respectively. In particular,
to distinguish social preferences between over in-group and out-group members and
across treatments, we construct ρg(j),t and σg(j),t. g(j) captures the group identity of
subject j that subject i is matched with, that is, g(j) ∈ {in, out}; t stands for the
treatment in which subject i plays, that is, t ∈ {N,CM,CO}. The utility is given as
follows, where πi and πj are the payoffs of subjects i and j respectively.
ui(·|g(j), t) =
ρg(j),tπj + (1− ρg(j),t)πi if πi ≥ πjσg(j),tπj + (1− σg(j),t)πi if πi < πj
Based on the model, the 21 choice problems are presented in three scenarios. The
first scenario of choice problems helps to calibrate σ and the second scenario helps to
calibrate ρ. The third scenario induces further information for both ρ and σ. 6
6Similar designs to elicit social preference parameters are employed in Blanco et al. (2011).
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Table 4.1: Choice problems: scenario 1
Option X Option Y
Problem Your earnings Other’s earnings Your earnings Other’s earnings
1 400 400 200 750
2 400 400 250 750
3 400 400 300 750
4 400 400 350 750
5 400 400 400 750
6 400 400 450 750
7 400 400 500 750
Table 4.2: Choice problems: scenario 2
Option X Option Y
Problem Your earnings Other’s earnings Your earnings Other’s earnings
1 600 600 500 200
2 600 600 600 200
3 600 600 700 200
4 600 600 700 300
5 600 600 700 400
6 600 600 700 500
7 600 600 700 600
Table 4.3: Choice problems: scenario 3
Option X Option Y
Problem Your earnings Other’s earnings Your earnings Other’s earnings
1 600 300 500 550
2 600 300 500 600
3 600 300 500 650
4 600 300 500 700
5 600 300 500 750
6 600 300 500 800
7 600 300 500 850
In part 3, each subject makes decisions for the same 21 choice problems as in part
2. If in part 2 she was matched with a subject from her own group, she is now matched
with a subject from the other group, and vice versa. In this way, for measuring in-
group-out-group differences, both between-subject and within-subject designs can be
employed. Charness et al. (2012) suggest that between-subject analyses are more
conservative, and that within-subject analyses are prone to carry-over and demand
effects though they sometimes are a closer match to a theoretical perspective. In our
case, the between-subject design is to obtain a cleaner measure of in-group-out-group
differences. Also, it is interesting to see whether the within-subject design has an
effect on subjects’ decisions. On the one hand, the within-subject design is likely to
increase subjects’ awareness of out-group so that in-group-out-group differences may
be stronger. On the other hand, in-group-out-group differences may not change (or
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even decrease) with the within-subject design, if subjects try to be consistent in two-
part decision-making.
At the end of the experiment, results and earnings for the calculation task and
choice problems are displayed. This can rule out the effect of outcomes of competitive
and cooperative interactions, since we are not interested in it in the present study.
4.2.2 Hypotheses
Contact theory suggests that contact featured with cooperation for a common goal can
reduce prejudice over out-groups. A number of experimental and empirical studies on
contact and out-group attitudes also confirm that positive contacts bring about more
favorable out-group attitudes. For negative contact, some papers show that conflictual
contacts with out-group members lead to more aggressive or hostile out-group attitudes
(see introduction).
In our study, on the one hand, the setting of “impersonal” interactions may reduce
the chance that subjects develop friendships; on the other hand, uncontrolled negative
feelings are less likely to occur between persons who interact with each other. These
facts imply that “impersonal” interactions may not be intense enough to reproduce
the effects of contact. We thus make weak hypotheses that cooperative interactions
with out-group members decrease in-group-out-group differences while competitive
interactions increase it or these interactions do not have an effect on in-group-out-
group differences.
For testing the effects of interactions on in-group-out-group differences, we need to
compare the differences in ρ and σ between the case in which subjects are matched
with an in-group member and the case in which subjects are matched with an out-
group member across treatments. The hypotheses are formalized as follows.
Hypotheses 1: the effect of competitive interactions on in-group-out-group differences
H1.a: ρin,N (σin,N)− ρout,N (σout,N) = ρin,CM (σin,CM)− ρout,CM (σout,CM)
H1.b: ρin,N (σin,N)− ρout,N (σout,N) < ρin,CM (σin,CM)− ρout,CM (σout,CM)
Hypotheses 2: the effect of cooperative interactions on in-group-out-group differences
H2.a: ρin,N (σin,N)− ρout,N (σout,N) = ρin,CO (σin,CO)− ρout,CO (σout,CO)
H2.b: ρin,N (σin,N)− ρout,N (σout,N) > ρin,CO (σin,CO)− ρout,CO (σout,CO)
H1.b means that competitive interactions with out-group members increase in-
group-out-group differences. H2.b means that cooperative interactions with out-group




The experiment was run in May, 2017 at Centerlab, Tilburg University and it was
computerized using the Z-tree software (Fischbacher 2007). Subjects were Tilburg
students and recruited via an online system. Upon arrival, subjects were assigned
to computers by randomly choosing one card from a pile of numbered cards. Upon
subjects were seated in the lab, printed copies of general instructions and instructions
for part 1 were distributed. After they finished reading instructions, the experiment
started. Subjects received instructions for part 2 and part 3 right after the preceding
part had ended.
After subjects finished all the three parts, they filled in a questionnaire, including
questions about age, gender, major of study, level of education, experience in experi-
ments, race, and guesses for the numbers of their own and average correct answers in
part 1. The guesses can be viewed as a proxy of the subjects’ belief of how much they
earned in part 1, which may have an income effect on their subsequent decisions in
parts 2 and 3.
In total, 12 sessions were run and 160 subjects participated in the experiment.
The number of subjects in each session is either 12 or 16. The numbers of subjects by
treatment are displayed in Table 4.4. Each session lasted for 20-30 minutes. Subjects
earned 9.28 euro on average, with a minimum of 4.06 euro and a maximum of 16.81
euro.





Notes: The table presents the numbers
of subjects by treatment. The second
(third) column reports the numbers
for the sessions in which subjects are
matched with in-group (out-group)
members in part 2 and with out-group
(in-group) members in part 3.
4.3 Results
To get a clean result of in-group-out-group differences as well as treatment effects, we
first only focus on the decisions subjects made in part 2. In the subsection about the
within-subject design, we take into account the decisions subjects made in part 3.
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4.3.1 Effects of Group Identity on Social Preferences across
Treatments
Let’s first look at the descriptive statistics of ρ and σ. To calibrate ρ and σ manually,
we use the observations of single-switch points in scenarios 2 and 1 respectively (see
appendix A for details of calibrations). In part 2, 4 out of 160 subjects did not make
choices that follow the single-switch rule in scenario 1 or 2. We therefore rule out the
corresponding choices (5 observations) from this analysis. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 display
the average calibrated ρ and σ by matching and treatment respectively.
Notes: The bars stand for calibrated ρ by matching and treatment (the nature of
interactions). The spikes with caps stand for the corresponding 95% confidence
intervals.
Figure 4.1: ρ by matching and treatment
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Notes: The bars stand for calibrated σ by matching and treatment. The spikes
with caps stand for the corresponding 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 4.2: σ by matching and treatment
For calibrated ρ, we can see that in the neutral treatment, its value is higher for
matched in-group members than for matched out-group members, though the differ-
ence is not salient. In the competitive treatment, subjects marginally favor in-group
members as well. In the cooperative treatment, we find that the favor over in-group
members is reversed in the sense that subjects exhibit more altruism towards out-group
members than towards in-group members.
For calibrated σ, we do not find salient in-group-out-group differences in both the
neutral and competitive treatments. In the cooperative treatment, subjects exhibit
milder negative attitude towards out-group members than towards in-group members.
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Table 4.5: Average ρ and σ by matching and treatment
Parameter Treatment In-group Out-group p-value
ρ
0.19 0.35
Cooperative (0.27) (0.37) 0.13
N = 28 N = 24
0.42 0.31
Neutral (0.36) (0.37) 0.29
N = 24 N = 26
0.20 0.18
Competitive (0.21) (0.28) 0.58
N = 31 N = 24
σ
-0.08 -0.002
Cooperative (0.17) (0.14) 0.07
N = 27 N = 24
-0.10 -0.07
Neutral (0.22) (0.19) 0.38
N = 24 N = 28
-0.02 -0.02
Competitive (0.17) (0.16) 0.67
N = 31 N = 24
Notes: The table mainly presents the average values of ρ and σ by match-
ing and treatment. Standard deviations are reported in the parentheses. N
stands for the number of independent observations, that is, the number of
subjects who made single-switch choices. The fourth column presents the
p-values of the rank-sum tests comparing between in-group and out-group
matching.
Table 4.5 displays the average values of calibrated ρ and σ by matching and treat-
ment as well as rank-sum tests comparing between in-group matching and out-group
matching for all treatments. In the neutral treatment, the average ρ for the in-group
matching is 0.42, which is higher than that for the out-group matching (0.31). We
conduct rank-sum tests, using subjects as units of independent observations. The dif-
ference in ρ between the in-group and out-group matching is not significant (p-value
= 0.29).7
Similarly, in the competitive treatment, the average ρ is higher for the in-group
matching (0.20) than for the out-group matching (0.18), but again the difference is
not significant (p-value = 0.58).
In the cooperative treatment, the average ρ is higher for the out-group matching
(0.35) than for the in-group matching (0.19). We see that cooperative interactions
with out-group members change the difference in favor of in-group members to that
in favor of out-group members.
Similarly, in both the neutral and competitive treatments we do not find significant
differences in σ between in-group and out-group matching. In the cooperative treat-
ment, subjects treat out-group matched players (-0.002) nicer than in-group matched
7The statistical power of the test is only 44.1% in a one-tail test at 5% type I error level. It
may be too conservative to conclude that in-group-out-group differences do not exist in the neutral
treatment. The same applies to the rank-sum test on σ.
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players (-0.08), and the difference is marginally significant (p-value = 0.07).
4.3.2 Effects of Interactions on In-group-Out-group Differ-
ences
From the results above, we can see that the gap in calibrated ρ and σ for in-group
and out-group members is different between the neutral treatment and the cooperative
treatment. It implies that cooperative interactions with out-group members matter
for in-group-out-group differences.
We employ parametric analyses to examine the treatment effects of interactions.
Specifically, we use maximum simulated likelihood estimations and a logit specification
with random individual effects.8 Thus the probabilities of option X and Y being chosen




Prob(Y ) = e
γu(Y )
eγu(X)+eγu(Y )
Take option X as an example. Suppose option X allocates xi to subject i and xj
to subject j who is matched with subject i. ui(X|g(j), t) can be given by
ui(X|g(j), t) =
ρg(j),txj + (1− ρg(j),t)xi if xi ≥ xjσg(j),txj + (1− σg(j),t)xi if xi < xj,
where g(j) captures the group identity of subject j and t stands for the treatment
(nature of interactions). ρg(j),t and σg(j),t are assumed to be linear functions of the
exogenous variables below. In-group is the dummy variable for whether the subject
is matched with an in-group member ( = 1) or an out-group member ( = 0). Com-
petitive (Cooperative) is the dummy variable for whether the subject interacted with
an out-group member in a competitive (cooperative) way ( = 1) or not ( = 0).9 The
treatment effects of competitive and cooperative interactions on in-group-out-group
differences are captured by the coefficients of In-group × Competitive and In-group ×
Cooperative, respectively.
γ captures the sensitivity of subjects’ decisions to u(Y )−u(X). If γ is equal to zero,
this model is equivalent to a random choice model with equal probability; when γ is
infinitely large, the probability of choosing either option with higher utility approaches
to one (McFadden 1981).
8The individual effects are added in the utilities of choosing option Y.
9So if a subject is involved in the neutral treatment, Cooperative = 0 and Competitive = 0.
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In-group × Competitive -0.016 -0.035
(0.032) (0.032)












In-group × Competitive 0.005 0.015
(0.051) (0.051)

















Notes: Controls stand for the characteristics of the
subject, including age, gender, level of education,
experiences in experiments, major of study, race,
and confidence which is measured by the difference
between the guesses for the numbers of one’s own
correct answers and the average correct answers
in the calculation task. Column (1) displays the
estimates when characteristics of subjects are not
controlled for. Column (2) displays the estimates
when characteristics of subjects are controlled for.
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p <0.01,
**p <0.05, *p <0.1
Table 4.6 presents the results. Let’s first look at the estimates for ρ. In the
column (1), the constant term for ρ is positive and significant, which indicates that
subjects in the neutral treatment on average exhibit altruism toward their matched
out-group players when they receive higher earnings. Also, the coefficient of In-group
is positive and significant (at 5% level in a one-tail test). It means that when subjects
in the neutral treatment receive higher earnings than their matched players do, they on
average exhibit a 22% (= 0.044/0.203) increase in altruism towards in-group matched
players than towards out-group matched players.
For the treatment effects on in-group-out-group differences, we find that the co-
efficient of Competitive is negative and significant, but the coefficient of In-group ×
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Competitive is not significant. It implies that competitive interactions decrease altru-
ism (of the richer) towards both in-group and out-group members to the same extent.
Thus H1.a cannot be rejected. The coefficient of In-group × Cooperative is negative
and significant. It indicates that cooperative interactions with out-group members
saliently decrease in-group-out-group differences in altruism, so that H2.a is rejected
and H2.b is supported. And the decrease in the in-group-out-group difference is sharp
enough to reverse in-group favoritism to out-group favoritism (0.044 − 0.089 < 0),
which is consistent with what was observed in Figure 4.1. We also compare the coef-
ficients of In-group × Competitive and In-group × Cooperative and the difference is
significant (p-value = 0.03). It indicates that the nature of interactions does matter
for in-group-out-group differences in altruism.
Next, let’s look at the estimates for σ. None of the major variables’ coefficients
is significant. So when subjects receive lower earnings than their matched players do,
their decisions are not significantly affected by these interactions in any sense.10
In summary, cooperative interactions with out-group members decrease the in-
group-out-group difference when subjects earn more than their matched players do,
while competitive interactions do not affect it. Subjects’ altruism is not responsive to
these interactions in any sense when they receive lower earnings than their matched
players do.
4.3.3 Within-subject Design and Order Effect
Last, we take into account the observations in part 3 and study whether in-group-
out-group differences will change with within-subject analyses and whether there is
an order effect for the within-subject designs. Here we only consider the neutral
treatment, ruling out potential interaction effects between sequential decision-making
and treatment effects. In particular, for within-subject analyses of in-group-out-group
differences, we separately look at the sessions in which subjects are first matched with
in-group members and the sessions in which subjects are first matched with out-group
members. Table 4.7 reports ρ and σ with within-subject and between-subject analyses
for the neutral treatment.
10The statistical power is no lower than 99.95% for all the estimates (comparing to zero) in Table
4.6, with both two-tail and one-tail tests at 5% type I error level. It means if there is truly an effect
of some variable, the parametric estimation in Table 4.6 is very likely to detect it.
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4.3. Results
Table 4.7: Within-subject and between-subject analyses for the neutral treatment
Within-subject Between-subject
Variables In-out Out-in Part 2
ρ
In-group 0.02 0.044* 0.049*
(0.026) (0.023) (0.026)
Constant 0.218*** 0.194*** 0.192***
(0.019) (0.017) (0.018)
σ
In-group -0.013 0.050* -0.013
(0.034) (0.029) (0.044)
Constant -0.037 -0.039 -0.047
(0.030) (0.027) (0.031)
γ
Constant 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.026***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Individual Effect
Std. 53.680*** 50.158*** 46.537***
(8.069) (9.853) (7.121)
Observations 1008 1176 1092
Log-likelihood -439.18 -531.857 -480.7
Notes: The table reports the maximum simulated likelihood es-
timates with a similar random effect logit model to Table 4.6.
The only difference is that now ρ and σ are assumed to be only
dependent on Ingroup. The second column presents the estimates
of the neutral treatment for subjects who are first matched with
an in-group member; the third column presents the estimates of
the neutral treatment for subjects who are first matched with an
out-group member; the fourth column presents the estimates of the
neutral treatment with part 2 observations alone. Standard errors
are in parentheses. ***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.1
First, we compare the coefficients of In-group between the second (third) column
and the fourth column, for both ρ and σ. Under the z-test which is suggested by Clogg
et al. (1995), we find that none of these differences is significant.11 It is indicated that
the within-subject design induces the same level of in-group-out-group differences as
the between-subject design does. This is consistent with the result from Chen and Li
(2009) who show that there is no significant difference in both “group-differentiating”
behaviors and self-reported attachment between within-subject and between-subject
designs.
Second, we compare the coefficients of In-group between the second column and
the third column. The coefficient of In-group is always smaller for the case in which
subjects are first matched with in-group members than for the case in which subjects
are first matched with out-group members. The difference is only marginally significant
for σ (at 10% level with a one-tail z-test) and not significant for ρ.12 We won’t make
too much out of the (at best) weak order effect. A tentative explanation is that when
subjects are first matched with out-group members, they may be a bit more aware
that this will be a game relevant to group identity, since it seems a bit more usual to
11Zρ(column2, column4) = (0.020−0.049)/
√
(0.0262+0.0262) = −0.789, Zρ(column3, column4) =
(0.044− 0.049)/
√
(0.0232 + 0.0262) = −0.144, Zσ(column2, column4) = 0, Zσ(column3, column4) =
(0.050 + 0.013)/
√
(0.0292 + 0.0442) = 1.196.
12Zρ(column2, column3) = (0.020−0.049)/
√
(0.0262+0.0232) = −0.691, Zσ(column2, column3) =
(0.050 + 0.013)/
√
(0.0292 + 0.0342) = 1.410 > 1.282.
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interact with in-group members.
4.4 Conclusion
This paper uses a minimal-group paradigm to study whether cooperative and compet-
itive interactions with out-group members matter for in-group-out-group differences.
We first confirm the existence of an in-group-out-group difference in altruism. We
show that when subjects receive higher earnings than their matched players do, they
exhibit more altruism toward an in-group matched player than toward an out-group
matched player. Chen and Li (2009) find a 47% increase in ρ and a 93% increase in
σ on average when subjects are matched with an in-group member compared to the
case in which they are matched with an out-group member. We find a much weaker
evidence that only ρ increases by 22% on average with in-group matching. But con-
sidering the fact that Chen and Li (2009) use the second mover’s data in sequential
games for the estimates of in-group-out-group differences in distributional preferences,
our study captures in-group-out-group differences in “purer” altruism with data from
dictator games.13
More importantly, we find that cooperative interactions with out-group members
decrease in-group-out-group differences in altruism when subjects receive higher earn-
ings than their matched players do, while competitive interactions do not affect it.
This suggests that “impersonal” interaction which involves cooperation for a common
goal can also reduce prejudice over out-groups. So as to weaken the difference favoring
in-group members over out-group members, it is not necessary to create chances for
people from different social groups to meet face-to-face or have a real talk. Linking
them with cooperative economic interdependence is sufficient for a reduction in in-
group-out-group differences. Besides, compared to Goette et al., (2012) who find that
intergroup competition increases in-group-out-group differences, our study suggests
that competitive interactions between persons have a much weaker effect on in-group-
out-group differences than intergroup competition does.
An interesting and unanswered question is that why subjects are unresponsive to
any variation in the condition when they are at a disadvantage of payoff comparisons.
Further studies on other moderators of in-group-out-group differences can be conduct-
ed. We are interested in whether this unresponsiveness also occurs to “poorer” people
in cases with other moderators, which might shed a light on a study on in-group-out-
group differences and poverty.
13Currarini and Mengel (2016) also capture in-group-out-group differences in altruism with dictator
games. But since they do not distinguish between the altruism of the richer and the poorer, their




4.5.A Single-switch Points and Calibrations of Parameters
Table 4.8: Single-switch points in scenario 2 and calibrations of ρ
Single-switch point in scenario 2 Range Calibration
All for option Y ρ ≤ −0.33 -0.33
2 −0.33 ≤ ρ < 0 -0.165
3 0 ≤ ρ < 0.2 0.1
4 0.2 ≤ ρ < 0.25 0.225
5 0.25 ≤ ρ < 0.33 0.29
6 0.33 ≤ ρ < 0.5 0.415
7 0.5 ≤ ρ < 1 0.75
All for option X ρ ≥ 1 1
Notes: This table presents how calibrations of ρ are dependent on
observed single-switch points from option X to option Y in scenario
2. For example, the sixth row displays if a subject’s choice switch-
es from option X to option Y at problem 5, the range of her ρ is
0.25 ≤ ρ < 0.33 and the calibration of ρ is 0.29. The range is derived
from u(Xproblem 4) = 600 ≥ u(Yproblem 4) = 300ρ + 700(1 − ρ) and
u(Xproblem 5) = 600 < u(Yproblem 5) = 400ρ + 700(1 − ρ). The calibration
0.29 is the midpoint of the range, that is, (0.25 + 0.33)/2 = 0.29. For cases in
which all choices are option Y (X), the calibration is obtained conservatively,
that is, the upper-bound (lower-bound) of the range.
Table 4.9: Single-switch points in scenario 1 and calibrations of σ
Single-switch point in scenario 1 Range Calibration
All for option Y σ ≥ 0.36 0.36
2 0.3 ≤ σ < 0.36 0.33
3 0.22 ≤ σ < 0.3 0.26
4 0.125 ≤ σ < 0.22 0.173
5 0 ≤ σ < 0.125 0.063
6 −0.17 ≤ σ < 0 -0.085
7 −0.4 ≤ σ < −0.17 -0.285
All for option X σ ≤ −0.4 -0.4
Notes: This table presents how calibrations of σ are dependent on observed single-
switch points from option X to option Y in scenario 1. For example, the seventh
row displays if a subject’s choice switches from option X to option Y at problem 6,
the range of her σ is −0.17 ≤ σ < 0 and the calibration of σ is -0.085. The range
is derived from u(Xproblem 5) = 400 > u(Yproblem 5) = 750σ + 400(1 − σ) and
u(Xproblem 6) = 400 ≤ u(Yproblem 6) = 750σ + 450(1− σ). The calibration -0.085
is the midpoint of the range, that is, (-0.17+0)/2 = -0.085. For cases in which all
choices are option Y (X), the calibration is obtained conservatively, that is, the
lower-bound (upper-bound) of the range.
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Welcome to the experiment. Please follow the instructions carefully. 
Please be quiet during the entire experiment and do not talk to other participants. If you have a 
question, raise your hand. An experimenter will then come to your computer to answer the question 
privately. 
The experiment consists of three parts and an additional questionnaire. You will receive 
instructions for Part 2 and Part 3 right after the preceding part has ended.  
Your earnings depend on your decisions and performance, the decisions and performance of other 
participants, and chance. In all parts of the experiment your earnings are expressed in tokens. The 
exchange rate is 160 tokens = 1 Euro.  
At the end of the experiment, you will be informed about the outcomes of all parts and about how 
much you earned in each part. Please follow the instructions of the experimenter then, and wait 
until your seat number is called before leaving the lab. You will receive your final earnings by 
bank transfer within three working days after the experiment.   
 
Assignment to a group 
 
At the beginning of the experiment, participants will be divided into two groups: a Red group and 
a Blue group.  The computer will randomly assign half of the participants to the Red group and 
the other half to the Blue group. The group to which you are assigned will be shown on the 
computer screen before Part 1 starts. In all parts, all participants get the same tasks and earnings 








[Intergroup Neutral Treatment]  
 
Task 
You are asked to make a series of calculations during one minute. For each calculation, you will 
see four single-digit numbers. Two of them are in Red color and the other two in Blue color.  You 
are asked to sum up the two numbers in Red color. The computer quietly keeps track of the number 
of correct answers.  
Example:  
3 0 7 2 
Your answer: ______ 
 
If and only if you type in 10 and click the “Submit” button, your answer counts as correct.  
You can see the time left in seconds at the upper right-hand corner of the screen. 
 
Earnings 
Your earnings are calculated as follows: 
Earnings = 40 tokens × your number of correct answers. 
At the end of the experiment, half of the participants will be randomly chosen by the computer to 
actually get paid their earnings for this task. Also, at the end of the experiment, you will be 
informed about your number of correct answers and your earnings in Part 1.   
4.5. Appendix
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[Intergroup Competition Treatment]  
Task 
You are asked to make a series of calculations during one minute. For each calculation, you will 
see four single-digit numbers. Two of them are in Red color and the other two in Blue color.  You 
are asked to sum up the two numbers in Red color. The computer quietly keeps track of the number 
of correct answers.  
Example:  
3 0 7 2 
Your answer: ______ 
 
If and only if you type in 10 and click the “Submit” button, your answer counts as correct.  
You can see the time left in seconds at the upper right-hand corner of the screen. 
 
Earnings 
You will be matched with a participant from the Blue Group, and your earnings depend on whether 
you win against this participant. You win if you have more correct answers than the participant 
from the Blue group, and you lose if you have fewer correct answers than the participant from the 
Blue group. If both of you have the same number of correct answers, the winner will be determined 
randomly. 
If you lose, your earnings are equal to 0 tokens. If you win, your earnings are calculated as follows:  
Earnings = 40 tokens × number of correct answers. 
You will be informed about your and the matched participant’s numbers of correct answers and 




[Intergroup Cooperation Treatment]  
Task 
You are asked to make a series of calculations during one minute. For each calculation, you will 
see four single-digit numbers. Two of them are in Red color and the other two in Blue color.  You 
are asked to sum up the two numbers in Red color. The computer quietly keeps track of the number 
of correct answers.  
Example:  
3 0 7 2 
Your answer: ______ 
 
If and only if you type in 10 and click the “Submit” button, your answer counts as correct.  
You can see the time left in seconds at the upper right-hand corner of the screen. 
 
Earnings 
You will be matched with a participant from the Blue group. Your earnings are calculated as 
follows: 
Earnings = 20 tokens × total number of correct answers by you and participant from the Blue 
Group. 
At the end of the experiment, half of the participants will be randomly chosen by the computer to 
actually get paid their earnings for this task. Also, at the end of the experiment, you will be 
informed about your and the matched participant’s number of correct calculations and your 










Part 2 [Ingroup Matching] 
Task 
You are asked to make a number of choices on allocations of tokens between yourself and another 
randomly selected participant of the Red group. That is, you will get to see 21 choice problems as 
follows, spread over three screens, that each has an option X and an option Y. For each of these 
problems, you are asked to choose option X or option Y. Each option defines how many tokens 
you and the other participant from the Red Group will get if you choose that option.  
Table 1 
 Option X Option Y Your 
Decision Problem Your earnings Other’s earnings Your earnings Other’s earnings 
1 400 400 200 750  
2 400 400 250 750  
3 400 400 300 750  
4 400 400 350 750  
5 400 400 400 750  
6 400 400 450 750  
7 400 400 500 750  
 
Table 2 
 Option X Option Y Your 
Decision Problem Your earnings Other’s earnings Your earnings Other’s earnings 
1 600 600 500 200  
2 600 600 600 200  
3 600 600 700 200  
4 600 600 700 300  
5 600 600 700 400  
6 600 600 700 500  
7 600 600 700 600  
 
Table 3 
 Option X Option Y Your 
Decision Problem Your earnings Other’s earnings Your earnings Other’s earnings 
1 600 300 500 550  
2 600 300 500 600  
3 600 300 500 650  
4 600 300 500 700  
5 600 300 500 750  
6 600 300 500 800  




For example, for Table 1 Problem 1, you and the matched participant both get 400 tokens if you 
choose option X, and you get 200 tokens and the matched participant gets 750 tokens if you choose 
option Y.  
The other participant performs the same task. 
 
Earnings 
At the end of the experiment, the computer randomly picks one choice problem that counts for 
payment and randomly determines whether your decision or the matched participant’s decision 
counts for payment.  











In Part 3 the task and calculation of earnings are exactly the same as in Part 2 except that now the 
other participant is a randomly selected participant of the Blue group.  
[Notice that the participant to whom you are matched now is different from the participant to whom 
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Fehr, E., Gächter, S., 2000. Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments.
American Economic Review 90(4), 980-994.
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